

Independent and Peaceful Australia Network (IPAN)
Transcript of IPAN Zoom 'Webinar' Recording
AUKUS and B-52s - Politics, Sovereignty and Security
Marking 3 years since the AUKUS Announcement
Monday 16 Sep 2024 7:00 - 8.30 pm AEST



Host: Kellie Tranter (Lawyer, Human Rights Activist) IPAN Patron

Prof the Hon Gareth Evans (Australian National University) will speak on the politics behind the AUKUS decision and outline what a comprehensive and genuinely objective review of AUKUS might look like if the Labor Government undertook such a task.

Dr Vince Scappatura (Macquarie Uni) and Professor Richard Tanter (Nautilus Institute) will present on findings from their 18-month study into the upcoming deployment of B-52 strategic bombers to RAAF Base Tindal – and the strategic implications for Australia.

DISCLAIMER: 'Any typing mistakes or errors are the result of the Zoom automated transcript process. IPAN asks that should readers wish to quote any of the comments in this transcript that they check against the Zoom recording'

Starting Time for each speaker (Sentence No.)

Kellie Tranter: 00:00:01.930 (1)

Gareth Evans: 00:03:45.340 (28)

Vince Scappatura: 00:22:01.060 (217)

Richard Tanter: 00:40:39.030 (301)

Note: Before the recording began

Kellie Tranter began her welcome, explaining that she has recently accepted the role of being a Patron of IPAN (along with Emeritus Professor Ian Lowe), and had previously been Chair of the IPAN People's Inquiry – Exploring the Case for an Independent and Peaceful Australia

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1

00:00:01.930 --> 00:00:02.950

Kellie Tranter: That's all right.

2

00:00:03.330 --> 00:00:09.980

Kellie Tranter: and I proudly took on those roles because IPAN's vision aims and mission align with my own.

3

00:00:10.210 --> 00:00:14.050

Kellie Tranter: that is, to live in a country that is capable of saying No to Washington.

4

00:00:14.080 --> 00:00:24.560

Kellie Tranter: and that does not risk becoming swept up without choice in the conflict that is not in our interests, but that plays a constructive and peaceful independent role in global affairs.

5

00:00:25.110 --> 00:00:30.920

Kellie Tranter: The topic of this webinar is AUKUS and B 52 s. Politics, sovereignty and security

6

00:00:31.180 --> 00:00:37.750

Kellie Tranter: understandably. Both the topic and the speakers have generated a great deal of interest. Thank you for joining us.

7

00:00:38.430 --> 00:00:46.260

Kellie Tranter: this evening's panelists individually and collectively, bring depth of knowledge, experience, wisdom, and energy. To the AUKUS conversation.

8

00:00:46.540 --> 00:00:54.730

Kellie Tranter: The aim is to conclude this webinar by 8 30 pm. Because our speakers and yourselves no doubt, have other commitments to attend to.

9

00:00:55.950 --> 00:01:10.419

Kellie Tranter: I'm sure I'm not alone, in my view, that AUKUS was never about our acquisition of nuclear submarines, but rather an opportunity with a catchy acronym to use to cover, permitting the United States to totally militarise Northern Australia

10

00:01:10.740 --> 00:01:24.300

Kellie Tranter: to enhance its position in its Indo-pacific zone of confrontation by basing and increasing the size of its forces and material, and as a place from which it can intimidate and, if necessary, carry out offensive operations against China.

11

00:01:25.040 --> 00:01:32.389

Kellie Tranter: It wasn't really that long ago that the United States used Northern Australia as its breadbasket, troop barracks, arsenal, and training ground

12

00:01:32.400 --> 00:01:34.440

Kellie Tranter: to resist and attack the Japanese.

13

00:01:34.920 --> 00:01:43.959

Kellie Tranter: Since then we've seen US Military facilities in Australia, expanded as required by the US Government for basing of their troops, military assets, and equipment.

14

00:01:44.290 --> 00:02:05.519

Kellie Tranter: They already have under strict US Control, fuel, storage tanks, maintenance facilities, ammunition bunkers, rotations of aircraft, including bombers, accommodation space ports, advanced intelligence gathering facilities, telescopes, radars, launch pads, for rockets, airstrips, parking facilities for major aircraft tankers, and more.

15

00:02:06.050 --> 00:02:07.500

Kellie Tranter: Yeah, anything missing

16

00:02:07.650 --> 00:02:11.569

Kellie Tranter: was a joint command centre in Darwin to run the whole show.

17

00:02:12.010 --> 00:02:14.059

Kellie Tranter: Join command in name only

18

00:02:14.070 --> 00:02:20.319

Kellie Tranter: because the Americans will be directing operations completely. That is the real nature of interchangeability.

19

00:02:20.690 --> 00:02:26.090

Kellie Tranter: That gap was filled with the announcement of the squadron operations facility in Darwin. Last year

20

00:02:26.410 --> 00:02:31.360

Kellie Tranter: a United States Air Force Mission Planning and Operations Center.

21

00:02:31.710 --> 00:02:50.029

Kellie Tranter: So the stage is set for using our country to threaten other people of the world at the moment, China, with weapons that have the capacity to inflict mass destruction and facilitate the death of an unquantifiable number of innocent men, women, and children. Obviously, that makes all of us living in Australia

22

00:02:50.040 --> 00:02:54.460

Kellie Tranter: primarily, but not just in Northern Australia. Potential military targets

23

00:02:54.830 --> 00:03:01.940

Kellie Tranter: before we begin. If you haven't already. Please ensure that your computer microphone is and remains on mute.

24

00:03:02.330 --> 00:03:07.859

Kellie Tranter: Our 1st speaker this evening is distinguished honorary professor at the Anu Professor Gareth Evans.

25

00:03:08.220 --> 00:03:17.199

Kellie Tranter: He has an impressive Cv. That will be known to most as a Cabinet Minister in the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments from 1,983 to 1,996,

26

00:03:18.060 --> 00:03:31.860

Kellie Tranter: in the post of Attorney General Minister for Resources and Energy Minister for Transport and Communications, and as Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1,988 to 1,996. He is a welcome and important voice in this debate.

27

00:03:31.970 --> 00:03:45.179

Kellie Tranter: Tonight we will speak on the politics behind the decision and outline. What a comprehensive and genuinely objective review of AUKUS might look like if the Labor Government actually undertook one over to you.

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00:03:45.340 --> 00:03:50.540

Gareth Evans: Well, thank you very much, Kellie, and it's a great opportunity to talk to you all, and I appreciate the invitation.

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00:03:50.800 --> 00:03:59.740

Gareth Evans: The AUKUS submarine deal has profound implications, none of them positive for Australia's security and our sovereignty.

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00:04:00.050 --> 00:04:10.429

Gareth Evans: Our embrace of it owes far more to political calculation, opportunism at the outset. And now nervousness as to the electoral consequences of changing course

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00:04:10.630 --> 00:04:14.280

Gareth Evans: than it does to sound strategic judgment.

32

00:04:14.950 --> 00:04:27.839

Gareth Evans: The deal is a gift both to the US And the UK. With no obvious downsides to either of them, but one very much at odds with our own national interest, which we will very long regret

33

00:04:28.420 --> 00:04:34.300

Gareth Evans: in Australia. Domestic political considerations have been a central factor really from the outset.

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00:04:34.580 --> 00:04:41.820

Gareth Evans: for the Morrison Government. It may be that the primary driver of their decision was their

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00:04:42.110 --> 00:04:43.990

Gareth Evans: ideological passion.

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00:04:44.130 --> 00:04:45.730

Gareth Evans: Coalition ministers

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00:04:45.740 --> 00:04:48.260

Gareth Evans: for all things American, with

38

00:04:49.100 --> 00:04:56.030

Gareth Evans: much massaging in this respect, going on from their hugely influential advisor, Andrew Sheeran.

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00:04:56.200 --> 00:04:59.859

Gareth Evans: But it's very hard to deny that political opportunism came a close second.

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00:05:00.020 --> 00:05:15.980

Gareth Evans: Morrison was deeply conscious of the opportunity the deal presented to wedge the Labor opposition in the defence and security space where the ALP has long been perceived, rightly or wrongly, as being electorally vulnerable.

41

00:05:16.450 --> 00:05:22.050

Gareth Evans: that the nuclear dimension of the deal was bound to ruffle some feathers and Labor ranks

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00:05:22.210 --> 00:05:26.300

Gareth Evans: was for Morrison very much an added political attraction.

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00:05:27.010 --> 00:05:44.420

Gareth Evans: I actually was not critical at the time, and nor am I now of the Opposition's initial response in September 21, when told at the very last minute by Morrison of the imminent announcement of the deal that he struck with the US And the UK. Which was in fact, premised on Labor's support.

44

00:05:44.680 --> 00:05:50.320

Gareth Evans: The political imperative, then, was pretty clear. Had Labor been at all equivocal.

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00:05:50.530 --> 00:05:58.389

Gareth Evans: 2022 would have been a Khaki election with Albanese depicted as undermining the alliance and

46

00:05:58.430 --> 00:06:01.370

Gareth Evans: undermining US commitment to the region.

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00:06:01.370 --> 00:06:01.980

Frank Vavasour: Wow!

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00:06:02.680 --> 00:06:08.280

Gareth Evans: Moreover, it has to be acknowledged, although I suspect a number of participants in this

49

00:06:08.870 --> 00:06:23.129

Gareth Evans: webinar won't agree. It has to be acknowledged. The deal seemed at least prima, facing to have some intellectual defensibility with nuclear propulsion clearly superior in terms of speed, endurance.

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00:06:23.180 --> 00:06:27.870

Gareth Evans: longevity, underwater, and at least for now detectability.

51

00:06:28.838 --> 00:06:33.240

Gareth Evans: And with nuclear proliferation and waste concerns.

52

00:06:33.861 --> 00:06:48.309

Gareth Evans: being, on the face of it, at least prima facie reasonably met by the lifetime sealed character of the highly enriched Union highly enriched uranium character of the of the propulsion unit.

53

00:06:48.920 --> 00:06:51.590

Gareth Evans: As I said publicly at the time, the Morrison Government

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00:06:51.640 --> 00:06:57.750

Gareth Evans: was roundly to be criticised for comprehensively mishandling the breakup with the French.

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00:06:57.900 --> 00:07:03.509

Gareth Evans: and there were very real decisions that still had to be answered before the submarine deal

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00:07:03.540 --> 00:07:05.340

Gareth Evans: was finally bedded down

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00:07:05.380 --> 00:07:23.960

Gareth Evans: in particular as to whether the force configuration proposed was really fully fit for Australia's own strategic defence purposes, and also the implications. And this is key to a lot of what's going to follow the implications of much greater enmeshment with the United States military

58

00:07:24.210 --> 00:07:27.829

Gareth Evans: for the reality of our own sovereign agency.

59

00:07:29.230 --> 00:07:35.289

Gareth Evans: As I argued. Then there was plenty of time when Labor came into power and government for review.

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00:07:35.670 --> 00:07:38.380

Gareth Evans: renegotiation, readjustment.

61

00:07:39.160 --> 00:07:46.249

Gareth Evans: What I am now critical of, and very critical is that when Labor did come into power a few months later in May 22,

62

00:07:46.410 --> 00:07:50.410

Gareth Evans: it's clear that no such review of the whole AUKUS project

63

00:07:50.720 --> 00:07:52.690

Gareth Evans: deal ever took place

64

00:07:52.750 --> 00:08:02.130

Gareth Evans: then, or even a year later, in the purportedly comprehensive Defence Strategic Review, which was led by Stephen Smith and Angus Houston.

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00:08:02.730 --> 00:08:06.179

Gareth Evans: Critical questions were never seriously addressed.

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00:08:06.690 --> 00:08:12.429

Gareth Evans: Clearly articulated answers to them have never been given by the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, anyone else.

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00:08:12.630 --> 00:08:19.999

Gareth Evans: and the answers that are, in fact, emerging as further time passes, are very deeply troubling.

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00:08:20.830 --> 00:08:26.529

Gareth Evans: If a genuinely comprehensive and genuinely objective review

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00:08:26.600 --> 00:08:29.879

Gareth Evans: were now to be initiated by the Albanese Government.

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00:08:30.320 --> 00:08:36.849

Gareth Evans: it would, I believe, have no choice but to make these 5 major findings

71

00:08:37.000 --> 00:08:40.789

Gareth Evans: which constitute the core of the critique, that I continue to make

72

00:08:41.270 --> 00:08:46.610

Gareth Evans: Paul Keating, Bob Garr, and many others about this deal. One.

73

00:08:47.020 --> 00:08:52.430

Gareth Evans: There is 0 certainty of the timely delivery of the 8 AUKUS boats.

74

00:08:52.750 --> 00:08:57.249

Gareth Evans: We now know that both the US And the UK have explicit opt out rights.

75

00:08:57.530 --> 00:09:10.660

Gareth Evans: and even in a wholly unlikely event that everything falls smoothly into place, and the whole vastly complex enterprise transfers of the US Virginia's British design and build of the new boats.

76

00:09:10.680 --> 00:09:15.329

Gareth Evans: Human resource, availability, manageable costs all the rest.

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00:09:15.560 --> 00:09:19.139

Gareth Evans: Even if all that implausibly falls into place.

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00:09:19.400 --> 00:09:24.059

Gareth Evans: We'll be waiting 40 years for the last boat to arrive.

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00:09:24.280 --> 00:09:28.009

Gareth Evans: posing obviously very real capability gap issues.

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00:09:28.720 --> 00:09:29.600

Gareth Evans: Second.

81

00:09:30.190 --> 00:09:39.850

Gareth Evans: even if we were to acknowledge for the sake of this argument unobjectively. It's some truth, even if we're to acknowledge the superior capability of the nuclear powered subs

82

00:09:39.940 --> 00:09:44.940

Gareth Evans: the final fleet size. 8 of these big boats, big beasts.

83

00:09:45.260 --> 00:09:50.130

Gareth Evans: if their purpose really is. The defence of Australia

84

00:09:50.550 --> 00:09:53.919

Gareth Evans: really appears hardly hardly fit for that purpose.

85

00:09:54.030 --> 00:09:56.710

Gareth Evans: Just how much intelligence, gathering

86

00:09:56.950 --> 00:10:00.740

Gareth Evans: or archipelagic choke point, interception, protection.

87

00:10:00.750 --> 00:10:02.610

Gareth Evans: or sea lion, protection.

88

00:10:02.890 --> 00:10:10.100

Gareth Evans: Well, even just deterrence at a distance. If you accept that, how much of any of that will be possible.

89

00:10:10.240 --> 00:10:13.349

Gareth Evans: given the usual operating constraints.

90

00:10:13.380 --> 00:10:16.310

Gareth Evans: which mean that only 2 of those boats

91

00:10:16.540 --> 00:10:18.810

Gareth Evans: will be deployable

92

00:10:18.860 --> 00:10:24.329

Gareth Evans: out there in our vast maritime environment. At any one time only 2 boats.

93

00:10:25.520 --> 00:10:26.400

Gareth Evans: 3.

94

00:10:27.040 --> 00:10:31.709

Gareth Evans: The eye watering cost of the Orca submarine program will make it very difficult.

95

00:10:31.900 --> 00:10:44.479

Gareth Evans: short of a very dramatic increase in defence share of GDP with all that that implies for other national priorities make it very difficult to acquire the other capabilities that we will need.

96

00:10:44.590 --> 00:11:01.349

Gareth Evans: If we have any kind of self reliance, capability, capacity in meeting an invasion threat if one were ever to occur if one were ever to arise. Those capabilities include in particular state of the art missiles, aircraft, and drones

97

00:11:01.820 --> 00:11:09.520

Gareth Evans: that are arguably even more critical than submarines for our defence in the event of such a crisis.

98

00:11:10.710 --> 00:11:11.530

Gareth Evans: 4.th

99

00:11:11.660 --> 00:11:14.249

Gareth Evans: And this is where the rubber, I think, really hits the road.

100

00:11:14.670 --> 00:11:21.279

Gareth Evans: the price now being demanded by the United States for giving us access to its nuclear protection.

101

00:11:21.470 --> 00:11:22.780

Gareth Evans: Technology

102

00:11:23.020 --> 00:11:29.540

Gareth Evans: is now it's becoming ever more clear, extraordinarily high, indefensibly high.

103

00:11:30.110 --> 00:11:41.880

Gareth Evans: Not only now the open ended expansion of Tindal as a US. 52 base, which will be, of course, comprehensively addressed a little later on tonight by Richard Tanta and Vince Scappatura.

104

00:11:42.150 --> 00:11:55.239

Gareth Evans: Not only the conversion of sterling submarine base into a major base for the US Indian ocean fleet making Perth now join Pine Gap and the North West Cape, and increasingly likely Tindal

105

00:11:55.300 --> 00:11:57.279

Gareth Evans: as a potential nuclear target.

106

00:11:58.080 --> 00:12:05.829

Gareth Evans: Not only the demand for what's now described, not only as the interoperability, but, as Kellie said, an introduction, the interchangeability

107

00:12:05.870 --> 00:12:07.799

Gareth Evans: of our submarine fleets.

108

00:12:08.380 --> 00:12:15.069

Gareth Evans: but also, in addition to all of that, the ever clearer expectation on the United States side.

109

00:12:15.450 --> 00:12:22.859

Gareth Evans: That integrated deterrence means Australia will have no choice, no choice but to join the United States

110

00:12:23.000 --> 00:12:30.479

Gareth Evans: in fighting any future war in which the US Chooses to engage anywhere in the Indo-pacific.

111
00:12:30.740 --> 00:12:32.820
Gareth Evans: particularly over Taiwan.

112
00:12:34.320 --> 00:12:38.750
Gareth Evans: It defies credibility to think that in the absence

113
00:12:38.930 --> 00:12:41.379
Gareth Evans: of that last understanding.

114
00:12:41.510 --> 00:12:44.500
Gareth Evans: the Virginia transfers will ever proceed.

115
00:12:45.010 --> 00:12:49.270
Gareth Evans: and the notion that we will retain any kind of sovereign agency

116
00:12:49.330 --> 00:12:55.870
Gareth Evans: in determining how all these assets are actually used should serious tensions erupt

117
00:12:56.300 --> 00:12:58.920
Gareth Evans: is frankly a joke in bad taste.

118
00:12:59.570 --> 00:13:02.919
Gareth Evans: I've had personal ministerial experience

119
00:13:03.050 --> 00:13:12.609
Gareth Evans: of being a junior Allied partner of the United States in a hot conflict situation in my case, the 1st Gulf War, the good Gulf War in 1,991,

120
00:13:12.960 --> 00:13:15.559
Gareth Evans: and my recollections of that experience

121
00:13:15.600 --> 00:13:20.299
Gareth Evans: without spelling it now publicly in any more detail, are not pretty.

122
00:13:20.470 --> 00:13:23.619
Gareth Evans: The United States takes its allies

123

00:13:24.230 --> 00:13:32.239

Gareth Evans: extremely for granted. In these situations the notion of any residual independent decision making agency

124

00:13:32.420 --> 00:13:34.240

Gareth Evans: forget it doesn't happen.

125

00:13:35.520 --> 00:13:36.630

Gareth Evans: Finally.

126

00:13:36.790 --> 00:13:42.580

Gareth Evans: 5th thing, I think any such comprehensive review would need to find if it was being at all objective

127

00:13:42.640 --> 00:13:45.090

Gareth Evans: is that the purchase price that we're now paying

128

00:13:45.210 --> 00:13:46.960

Gareth Evans: for all its exorbitants

129

00:13:47.010 --> 00:13:48.649

Gareth Evans: will never be enough

130

00:13:48.730 --> 00:13:52.430

Gareth Evans: to guarantee the absolute protective insurance

131

00:13:52.510 --> 00:13:55.970

Gareth Evans: that supporters of AUKUS think that they're buying

132

00:13:56.360 --> 00:13:59.060

Gareth Evans: ansis can't be said too often

133

00:13:59.560 --> 00:14:03.419

Gareth Evans: does not bind the United States to defend us militarily.

134

00:14:03.450 --> 00:14:06.229

Gareth Evans: even in the event of an existential attack.

135

00:14:06.910 --> 00:14:11.840

Gareth Evans: An extended nuclear deterrence is as illusory for us

136
00:14:12.180 --> 00:14:19.169
Gareth Evans: as for every other ally or partner believing itself to be sheltering under United States nuclear umbrella.

137
00:14:19.580 --> 00:14:27.769
Gareth Evans: The notion that the United States would ever be prepared to run the risk of sacrificing Los Angeles or Tokyo or Seoul, let alone Perth

138
00:14:28.920 --> 00:14:33.350
Gareth Evans: is, and always has been, nonsense.

139
00:14:33.840 --> 00:14:38.639
Gareth Evans: We can rely on US military support. If Washington sees that

140
00:14:39.120 --> 00:14:44.339
Gareth Evans: sees this as being in United States own national interest to offer it, but not otherwise.

141
00:14:44.710 --> 00:14:54.229
Gareth Evans: Washington will no doubt shake a deterrent fist, and it will threaten and deliver retaliation if its own assets on Australian soil

142
00:14:54.450 --> 00:14:56.290
Gareth Evans: are threatened or attacked.

143
00:14:56.650 --> 00:15:01.050
Gareth Evans: But that's as far as our expectations should extend.

144
00:15:02.080 --> 00:15:10.989
Gareth Evans: The bottom line. In all this, I think, was very precipiently stated by Jean Yves le Durian, the then French Foreign Minister, in reacting to the Morrison decision

145
00:15:11.070 --> 00:15:13.799
Gareth Evans: in 2021, when he said, and I quote.

146
00:15:13.920 --> 00:15:20.370
Gareth Evans: the Australians placed themselves entirely at the mercy of developments in American policy.

147
00:15:20.700 --> 00:15:23.229
Gareth Evans: I wish our Australian partner.

148

00:15:23.270 --> 00:15:30.199

Gareth Evans: who made the choice of security justified by the escalation of tensions with China to the detriment of sovereignty.

149

00:15:30.570 --> 00:15:35.289

Gareth Evans: will not discover later that it has sacrificed both

150

00:15:37.140 --> 00:15:46.349

Gareth Evans: in the event that some of this political light did start to dawn on the Albanese government, and it did start to now explore a plan. B.

151

00:15:46.500 --> 00:15:53.469

Gareth Evans: It wouldn't be impossibly late, at least technically, to fundamentally change course. Yet again.

152

00:15:53.510 --> 00:15:58.790

Gareth Evans: with the most attractive option probably being, if Paris never felt able to trust us again.

153

00:15:58.850 --> 00:16:17.220

Gareth Evans: The revival of the French contract. This not only provided, you remember, for the delivery of 12 conventionally powered, but very capable boats at a reasonable cost and within a reasonable timeframe, but also did explicitly allow for a nuclear option nuclear propulsion option to be pursued. Should we so desire

154

00:16:17.580 --> 00:16:28.880

Gareth Evans: making such a change now would involve obviously much more time and expense and some new and quite serious complications, and working out how to manage the nuclear refueling and maintenance

155

00:16:28.920 --> 00:16:33.720

Gareth Evans: needs of a low, enriched leu uranium system.

156

00:16:33.900 --> 00:16:43.890

Gareth Evans: But overall, as we think, from an HEU closed unit system. But overall, I think it would involve much less baggage for us than continuing with the unit with the AUKUS program.

157

00:16:44.690 --> 00:16:47.870

Gareth Evans: All that said it has to be acknowledged.

158

00:16:47.970 --> 00:16:51.590

Gareth Evans: but the odds of any fundamental change, of course.

159
00:16:51.690 --> 00:16:54.439
Gareth Evans: are now very long indeed.

160
00:16:55.230 --> 00:17:03.679
Gareth Evans: The only external event that could completely derail the AUKUS program and force such change would be for the United States

161
00:17:03.800 --> 00:17:06.230
Gareth Evans: to make it clear that it was not going to give up

162
00:17:06.450 --> 00:17:11.100
Gareth Evans: any of its Virginia's because of the pressures on its own replacement program.

163
00:17:11.530 --> 00:17:14.859
Gareth Evans: But it's hard to imagine even a trump administration doing that.

164
00:17:15.290 --> 00:17:21.780
Gareth Evans: Given the extraordinary favourability of the deal that the United States has run out of Australia

165
00:17:22.180 --> 00:17:23.819
Gareth Evans: not only financially.

166
00:17:23.920 --> 00:17:32.420
Gareth Evans: but because, for all practical purposes, the Americans will be able to treat these boats as an extension of their own fleet.

167
00:17:33.560 --> 00:17:37.020
Gareth Evans: The prospects of a political change of heart in Australia

168
00:17:37.440 --> 00:17:39.480
Gareth Evans: are even more problematic

169
00:17:39.860 --> 00:17:41.530
Gareth Evans: on the part of the Coalition.

170
00:17:41.870 --> 00:17:46.220
Gareth Evans: In the absence of the reincarnation of Malcolm Turnbull, they're non-existent

171

00:17:46.720 --> 00:17:49.659

Gareth Evans: and on the part of the ALP. They're really.

172

00:17:49.780 --> 00:17:51.870

Gareth Evans: I'll have to concede not much better.

173

00:17:52.450 --> 00:18:01.520

Gareth Evans: I've referred elsewhere to Richard Marles Defence Minister, Richard Marles, as love of the United States as being so dewy eyed as to defy parody.

174

00:18:02.210 --> 00:18:06.810

Gareth Evans: Poor Minister Penny Wong is far more obedient, and instinctively weary

175

00:18:06.850 --> 00:18:10.550

Gareth Evans: of over commitment to America's view of itself.

176

00:18:11.050 --> 00:18:14.710

Gareth Evans: but she's been unwilling to rock the political boat

177

00:18:15.280 --> 00:18:17.310

Gareth Evans: and the Prime Minister himself. Albo

178

00:18:17.380 --> 00:18:23.160

Gareth Evans: not only has never given much attention to the complexities of defence and foreign policy very unusual for

179

00:18:23.260 --> 00:18:29.709

Gareth Evans: the Labor left, but it does remain politically, deeply risk, averse.

180

00:18:29.780 --> 00:18:34.569

Gareth Evans: preoccupied more than anything else with not being portrayed domestically as weak.

181

00:18:34.660 --> 00:18:36.459

Gareth Evans: vacillating on security.

182

00:18:37.520 --> 00:18:43.750

Gareth Evans: So all of this, finally, really is very depressing, for those of us who've long nurtured the belief that

183

00:18:43.790 --> 00:18:47.850

Gareth Evans: Australia is a fiercely independent nation.

184

00:18:47.970 --> 00:18:54.630

Gareth Evans: ever more conscious of the need to engage constructively, creatively, and sensitively.

185

00:18:54.670 --> 00:18:57.890

Gareth Evans: with our own Indo-pacific neighbourhood.

186

00:18:58.090 --> 00:19:02.960

Gareth Evans: and with a vibrant multicultural society, ever more representative of the world around us.

187

00:19:03.620 --> 00:19:05.339

Gareth Evans: a country, moreover.

188

00:19:05.360 --> 00:19:09.410

Gareth Evans: which had long, which had come to terms at last with the reality

189

00:19:09.770 --> 00:19:17.110

Gareth Evans: that in the new century our geography really does matter much more than our Anglophone

190

00:19:17.390 --> 00:19:18.460

Gareth Evans: history.

191

00:19:18.910 --> 00:19:21.760

Gareth Evans: and a country which had put behind it

192

00:19:21.980 --> 00:19:23.950

Gareth Evans: the fear of abandonment

193

00:19:24.110 --> 00:19:29.119

Gareth Evans: which have been so central to our defence and diplomacy for so much of the last century.

194

00:19:29.270 --> 00:19:40.389

Gareth Evans: Recognising as Paul, continues, Paul Keating continues to put it so articulately that we need to find our security in Asia, not from Asia.

195

00:19:41.050 --> 00:19:42.080

Gareth Evans: So.

196
00:19:43.230 --> 00:19:45.639
Gareth Evans: as I've been saying publicly for some time.

197
00:19:45.850 --> 00:19:47.610
Gareth Evans: echoing, tweeting.

198
00:19:48.000 --> 00:19:52.280
Gareth Evans: Australia's no holds barred embrace of AUKUS

199
00:19:52.470 --> 00:19:59.029
Gareth Evans: is more likely than not to prove one of the worst defence and foreign policy decisions this country has ever made.

200
00:19:59.600 --> 00:20:03.310
Gareth Evans: not only putting a profound risk. Our sovereign independence.

201
00:20:03.440 --> 00:20:06.580
Gareth Evans: but generating more risk than reward

202
00:20:06.750 --> 00:20:11.980
Gareth Evans: for the very national security it promises to protect.

203
00:20:12.360 --> 00:20:13.800
Gareth Evans: I can't imagine

204
00:20:13.820 --> 00:20:18.930
Gareth Evans: this decision being made by any of the Hawke Keating governments of which I was part.

205
00:20:19.050 --> 00:20:21.869
Gareth Evans: even when Kim Beazley was Defence. Minister

206
00:20:22.400 --> 00:20:25.259
Gareth Evans: times, unfortunately, have changed.

207
00:20:25.520 --> 00:20:26.339
Gareth Evans: Thank you.

208
00:20:31.930 --> 00:20:36.029

Kellie Tranter: Thank you so much, Professor Evans, and you've given a very sobering assessment.

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00:20:36.413 --> 00:20:42.069

Kellie Tranter: But I wish to thank you for adding your your voice, because it helps to galvanize

210

00:20:42.200 --> 00:20:54.239

Kellie Tranter: the citizenry into really thinking about how to scuttle AUKUS. Even though the prospects seem poor. You just never know with

211

00:20:54.240 --> 00:21:13.670

Kellie Tranter: political pressure, and people talking about the issue and writing about the issue, and and agitating for change. You know, there's there's always some hope. But thank you very, very much on behalf of many people who have been campaigning against AUKUS for a very long time for adding your voice.

212

00:21:13.940 --> 00:21:26.630

Kellie Tranter: I'll move on. I'm conscious of the time, and I know we do want to finish at 8 30. Our second speaker is Dr. Vince Scappatura. He teaches politics and international relations at Macquarie University.

213

00:21:26.870 --> 00:21:30.599

Kellie Tranter: His latest book is the US Lobby and Australian Defence policy.

214

00:21:30.730 --> 00:21:34.129

Kellie Tranter: Vince was a panel member for the IPAN people's inquiry

215

00:21:34.390 --> 00:21:41.400

Kellie Tranter: between 2,020 and 2,022 together. Richard and Vince will present their extremely important findings

216

00:21:41.630 --> 00:21:59.590

Kellie Tranter: from their 18 month study into the upcoming deployment of B. 52 bombers to Raf. Base, Tindal, and the strategic implications for Australia. But 1st is Dr. Scappatura, Vince, talking about where we are and where we are headed, headed. Thank you, Vince. You have the floor.

217

00:22:01.060 --> 00:22:09.800

Vince Scappatura: Great. Thank you very much for that introduction, Kellie, and thank you very much, Gareth, for that very comprehensive rebuttal of AUKUS

218

00:22:09.870 --> 00:22:12.669

Vince Scappatura: on on strategic and economic

219

00:22:12.770 --> 00:22:18.400

Vince Scappatura: and most importantly, national sovereignty and ultimately national interest grounds.

220

00:22:19.060 --> 00:22:35.259

Vince Scappatura: I'm going to, as Kellie mentioned, change tack slightly by shifting the discussion to other elements of Australia's integration into US War fighting.

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00:22:35.380 --> 00:22:57.640

Vince Scappatura: Gareth mentioned that one particular element of a very important element of the AUKUS deal is not so much the question around whether Australia needs nuclear powered submarines or not. But the AUKUS framework within which the nuclear powered submarines are being acquired, and the implications for Australia's sovereignty.

222

00:22:58.060 --> 00:23:11.229

Vince Scappatura: and Gareth mentioned the expectations, the very clear expectations from the Americans that Australia will participate in the Biden Administration's term of integrated deterrence.

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00:23:11.870 --> 00:23:20.719

Vince Scappatura: I want to focus on one particular element of integrated deterrence, integrated nuclear deterrence in particular.

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00:23:21.110 --> 00:23:31.389

Vince Scappatura: And on that note, although there are important nuclear war fighting elements to AUKUS, even though they are conventionally armed at nuclear powered submarines.

225

00:23:32.440 --> 00:23:59.750

Vince Scappatura: The most important developments are, in fact, non-AUKUS related, and they are signalled by what Kellie mentioned in your introduction, the US Force Posture, initiative in particular, more frequent rotations of US Strategic bombers in Northern Australia, but especially the infrastructure upgrades, and at Tindal Air Force base in the Northern territory

226

00:23:59.910 --> 00:24:18.810

Vince Scappatura: in particular, to accommodate the the forward basing of Up to 6 B 52 strategic bombers, and most likely other strategic bombers as well. And what I'm going to argue is that these developments together signal the the development of

227

00:24:18.810 --> 00:24:32.399

Vince Scappatura: shaping of a new nuclear defence posture for Australia, new ways in which Australia is likely to be expected to support US Nuclear war fighting

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00:24:32.520 --> 00:24:35.129

Vince Scappatura: in any potential future conflict.

229

00:24:35.430 --> 00:24:43.300

Vince Scappatura: So I'm going to talk about a little bit about about that I'm going to talk about. Why, it's a significant departure from where we've come from in the past.

230

00:24:43.570 --> 00:24:48.549

Vince Scappatura: and I'm also going to discuss briefly where I think we may be we may be headed.

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00:24:48.570 --> 00:25:03.250

Vince Scappatura: and then, after doing the very easy job of explaining what a great big mess we're in, I'm going to turn over to Richard, who has the much harder job of explaining how we might get out of it, or at the very least, you know what what needs to be done, what should be done

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00:25:03.690 --> 00:25:05.280

Vince Scappatura: at the present moment?

233

00:25:06.200 --> 00:25:11.510

Vince Scappatura: Okay, so there are nuclear war fighting dimensions of AUKUS.

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00:25:11.890 --> 00:25:35.599

Vince Scappatura: I think it's important to point out. You know, it's conceivable that Australia's future nuclear powered submarines will be involved in hunter killer operations against Chinese Ssbns, Chinese nuclear armed submarines. It's possible that Australian future nuclear powered submarines will be involved in operations against conventional Chinese

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00:25:35.600 --> 00:25:55.800

Vince Scappatura: armed submarines in order to help free up the US Navy to undertake operations against Chinese nuclear armed submarines, which, of course, is a very significant concern for the Chinese. Given that nuclear armed submarines are often a guaranteed second strike capability.

236

00:25:56.640 --> 00:26:10.509

Vince Scappatura: It's also conceivable that the American Virginia attack class submarines that will be rotating through operating from the new base or the new upgraded base at Hms. Sterling could one day be nuclear armed.

237

00:26:11.040 --> 00:26:18.379

Vince Scappatura: US Attack class submarines are not nuclear armed at present. They haven't been since 1,991,

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00:26:18.430 --> 00:26:25.269

Vince Scappatura: but that could change it could change with a new Presidential directive.

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00:26:25.370 --> 00:26:34.739

Vince Scappatura: It was a presidential directive which removed those nuclear arms from attack submarines, and it could be a Presidential directive which redeploys them.

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00:26:35.910 --> 00:26:43.130

Vince Scappatura: and, in fact, there is funding authorized by Congress for the development of a new submarine launched cruise nuclear missile.

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00:26:43.180 --> 00:26:47.510

Vince Scappatura: which could in the future be redeployed to attack submarines. So

242

00:26:47.750 --> 00:27:17.539

Vince Scappatura: there are possibilities, conceivable possibilities for nuclear dimensions as part of the integrated nuclear deterrence that Gareth was talking about with AUKUS, but, as I mentioned, I actually don't think that at least in the short to medium term, that's where the most important and significant developments are the significant developments are in the more frequent bomber rotations, but in particular the dedicated air base infrastructure upgrades, and most significantly at Tindal.

243

00:27:20.600 --> 00:27:32.270

Vince Scappatura: This is important, too, because when asked about the potential implications, not just of AUKUS, but particularly the B 52 s. The government's response is just to play this down.

244

00:27:32.580 --> 00:27:47.109

Vince Scappatura: in fact, not just play it down, but be misleading about it. When Miles, for example, is asked about the significance of the B. 52 S. His response is, Oh, well, you know, we've had visit Australia for a long period of time, you know, since the 1980 S.

245

00:27:47.160 --> 00:27:55.359

Vince Scappatura: And although that's true. It's 1 thing to have US strategic bombers visit Australia

246

00:27:55.360 --> 00:28:19.929

Vince Scappatura: for interoperability and to train in our practice long range bombing runs in the Northern territory. It's quite another when we have dedicated infrastructure, the squadrons operation facility that Kellie mentioned before for mission planning for crew briefings for intelligence support along with fuel reserves and tanker aircraft.

247

00:28:20.230 --> 00:28:34.680

Vince Scappatura: the stockpiling of weapons, and so forth, which mean that for the 1st time in Australia's history, we have the possibility of US nuclear combat operations being launched from Australian territory.

248

00:28:35.640 --> 00:28:45.059

Vince Scappatura: This is very different to the past. Australia has played a very significant role and continues to in US nuclear war fighting, deterrence

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00:28:45.390 --> 00:28:52.609

Vince Scappatura: through intelligence and communication support, namely, through, of course, Pine Gap, also Northwest Cape.

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00:28:53.090 --> 00:28:57.719

Vince Scappatura: It's very significant. There are. There are issues there to contend with that are important.

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00:28:58.591 --> 00:29:01.550

Vince Scappatura: But these are non kinetic

252

00:29:01.670 --> 00:29:12.030

Vince Scappatura: support for US Nuclear war fighting operations, intelligence communications. What we're talking about now with the dedicated facilities, with the possibility of

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00:29:12.150 --> 00:29:26.480

Vince Scappatura: combat operations from Australian soil is very different, and I think does signify the development, the shaping of a potentially new type of Australian support for US Nuclear war fighting.

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00:29:27.420 --> 00:29:43.139

Vince Scappatura: The one way that the Government has the Albanese Government has, and the Morrison Government prior to that, has been misleading about this is to downplay its significance. But the other the other way. Longstanding way the Government has obfuscated on this issue

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00:29:43.220 --> 00:29:56.549

Vince Scappatura: is, you know, when when asked about, you know, will these B, 52 bombers be nuclear armed, or even will the B 52 bombers be nuclear capable? Not all. B, 52 s. Are, in fact, nuclear capable. Some are conventional only

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00:29:56.660 --> 00:30:00.280

Vince Scappatura: when asked this question the Government's response is, well.

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00:30:00.600 --> 00:30:09.829

Vince Scappatura: the US has a longstanding policy of neither confirming or denying whether there are nuclear weapons on aircraft ships and so forth. We respect and understand and adhere to that.

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00:30:10.730 --> 00:30:14.170

Vince Scappatura: That's the 1st element of

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00:30:14.510 --> 00:30:39.340

Vince Scappatura: of the 1st way that the Albanese Government kind of hides behind this issue. The second way is to say, Look, be that as it may, US bombers don't usually fly with nuclear weapons on board in in peacetime, and, thirdly, it

then cites the Raratonga Treaty. Australia is applied to the Raratonga Treaty, the nuclear Southwest Pacific Zone free zone

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00:30:39.340 --> 00:30:46.899

Vince Scappatura: that prohibits nuclear weapons from being stationed on Australian territory. The United States respects

261

00:30:46.900 --> 00:31:08.149

Vince Scappatura: our position on that, therefore, there is no real issue here. Well, what's missing from from that explanation is that, yes, the Raratonga Treaty prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons in Australian territory. It does not prohibit transiting or visiting of nuclear weapons on board US Aircraft US Strategic bombs or ships.

262

00:31:09.190 --> 00:31:31.690

Vince Scappatura: So there are no legal or policy impediments to the possibility of nuclear operations. Combat operation being launched from Australia or US Strategic bombers having nuclear weapons on board. Now, it is true, as Miles has said, and others that in normal peacetime operations the strategic bombers don't carry are not armed with nuclear weapons. Americans don't do it. The Russians don't do it. It's just too dangerous.

263

00:31:31.790 --> 00:31:35.779

Vince Scappatura: It was the case during the Cold War, but but not anymore.

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00:31:35.960 --> 00:31:48.130

Vince Scappatura: Of course that situation can change in the midst of a crisis. If there were a significant security crisis, a potential war on the brink of a potential war between the United States and China.

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00:31:48.610 --> 00:32:01.759

Vince Scappatura: Then those nuclear bombers could be armed with nuclear weapons, and there would not be any significant legal policy impediments for them, continuing to rotate through Australia in that event.

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00:32:03.470 --> 00:32:31.879

Vince Scappatura: and so on. That note, as Kellie mentioned, Richard and I recently published a special report with the Nautilus Institute, which provides the heart of it, provides a visual guide, which enables readers to be able to distinguish between the conventional only B. 52 s. That I mentioned, and the nuclear capable B. 52 s. Again, when the government's asked about this question, they refuse to to offer any transparency.

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00:32:31.900 --> 00:32:53.770

Vince Scappatura: referring again to the policy of neither confirm nor deny. So we hope that this paper will provide a small measure of transparency and accountability, so that when these well, we have B 52 bombers and other strategic bombers rotating through Australian bases now, but particularly when the ones to Tindal Air force base come through. We'll be able to know whether these bombers are

268

00:32:53.770 --> 00:33:10.189

Vince Scappatura: nuclear capable, whether the US is sending nuclear capable or conventional only bombers and the strategic implications of each of those, of course, is very different. You would think it would be important for the Australian public to know that. But we're not going to be told by the US Government and not our own government. It seems

269
00:33:10.280 --> 00:33:18.290
Vince Scappatura: so. That's kind of the purpose, or the rationale, or the hope of the paper that Richard and I recently published.

270
00:33:19.780 --> 00:33:28.159
Vince Scappatura: Okay, so just

270
00:33:19.780 --> 00:33:28.159
Vince Scappatura: Okay, so just in the few remaining minutes that I have, I want to talk about where I think we could be headed.

271
00:33:28.540 --> 00:33:32.020
Vince Scappatura: because, as bad as things are at the moment they could get worse.

272
00:33:32.500 --> 00:33:52.309
Vince Scappatura: We are not at the situation now, which is equivalent to say, for example, NATO, or even, indeed, the US And South Korea, in the way in which we are integrated into US nuclear war fighting operations.

273
00:33:52.480 --> 00:34:03.290
Vince Scappatura: There are a number of quite prominent and influential strategic commentators that are pushing for a kind of natoisation of the Australia-US relationship.

274
00:34:03.510 --> 00:34:27.680
Vince Scappatura: And what that would mean in the nuclear domain would be formalising the nuclear relationship by creating policy, guidance or joint planning at the policy level that would spell out essentially pre commitments that Australia would make in support of US nuclear war fighting operations. So with NATO, there is the the nuclear planning group.

275
00:34:28.330 --> 00:34:45.380
Vince Scappatura: And this involves, of course, those 5 countries that host nuclear weapons to engage in joint planning for the event of a nuclear war, those weapons being released to those countries and being used in nuclear combat operations, but it also involves other NATO countries.

276
00:34:45.380 --> 00:35:09.889
Vince Scappatura: They don't host US Nuclear weapons, but they engage in what are called snowcat operations. Snowcat support for nuclear operations with conventional air tactics. And what this means is, there are NATO countries

which have joint planning, pre-commitments to provide conventional support to US Nuclear operations, such as air, refueling air, protection, air, early warning and control.

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00:35:09.920 --> 00:35:13.610

Vince Scappatura: early airborne warning and control, base protection. And so on.

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00:35:14.130 --> 00:35:23.850

Vince Scappatura: The United States set up a recent nuclear consultative group for a similar type of arrangement with the Republic of Korea not too long ago.

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00:35:24.030 --> 00:35:41.669

Vince Scappatura: If this were to occur in Australia, then it would involve, as I mentioned joint planning, explicit nuclear exercises, the kind of interoperability exercises we engage in now and not explicit nuclear planning for nuclear operations.

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00:35:41.810 --> 00:35:49.210

Vince Scappatura: And ultimately, as I mentioned, it would involve pre-commitments on behalf of Australia to provide conventional support to US nuclear combat operations.

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00:35:49.340 --> 00:35:51.780

Vince Scappatura: We are not at that level of planning, yet

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00:35:52.040 --> 00:35:55.620

Vince Scappatura: we have the integration at the operational level

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00:35:55.860 --> 00:36:22.520

Vince Scappatura: to enable such cooperation with the base, the bases with the dedicated facilities, with the interoperability exercises where Australia is practicing refueling B, 52 s. And other B, 2 bombers where we're providing air protection and early warning command and control, and so on. So operationally, we're developing that way. But on the policy level, it's not that developed yet, and that's that's a good thing. But this could change.

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00:36:22.560 --> 00:36:47.459

Vince Scappatura: In fact, it's already changing in 2019. There was the strategic policy dialogue that was established between Australia and the United States to have discussions about extended deterrence and presumably extended nuclear deterrence. It's not at the level of NATO or the US-ROK¹ nuclear consultative group, but it could be the foundations to move in that direction. As I said, there are advocates who are pushing for us to move in that way

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00:36:48.890 --> 00:37:14.850

Vince Scappatura: now. The Australian Government has been reluctant, in fact, to engage in that kind of consultative joint planning for a couple of reasons. The 1st is the fear of entrapment, and that's very wise. We don't want to be

¹not **UK-ROK** as referred to by mistake in the zoom presentation

entrapped with pre commitments to engage in US nuclear war fighting operations. But the other concern is just the likelihood of domestic backlash.

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00:37:15.010 --> 00:37:42.049

Vince Scappatura: The Government doesn't want to have a debate about Australian possible participation extended nuclear deterrence, and it would have to if it publicly revealed this type of consultative, formalized policy agreement. It doesn't want to have a debate about AUKUS, a proper strategic debate about AUKUS, let alone the idea of Australian participation in US Nuclear war fighting operations. So for these 2 reasons it's been reluctant to engage in that way. But, as I said, there are forces pushing in that direction

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00:37:42.320 --> 00:37:43.530

Vince Scappatura: now.

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00:37:43.620 --> 00:37:52.330

Vince Scappatura: it's better that we don't go in that direction, of course, but the situation now isn't a whole lot better, and that's because, as Gareth mentioned.

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00:37:52.400 --> 00:38:04.910

Vince Scappatura: the kind of operational integration signified by AUKUS sends a very clear expectation to the Americans that we will be there in the ways that they expect, including, I think, in the nuclear domain.

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00:38:04.970 --> 00:38:31.409

Vince Scappatura: You know, Gary mentioned the type of, you know, the personal experience that he had in coming under pressure from the United States. I mean, you can imagine the kind of pressure that a future Australian Government will come under. If the US Was in the event of a crisis which could be an existential crisis, it could go nuclear the kind of pressure the Australian Government would come under to allow the United States to use the very significant capabilities that it's built up in Australia and for Australia to support the kinds of operations that he has been training to support.

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00:38:31.410 --> 00:38:35.970

Vince Scappatura: that has been engaging in such interoperability exercises to support

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00:38:36.280 --> 00:38:54.519

Vince Scappatura: the Americans very much are getting this message. This was signaled recently by comments by Michael Mccall, the head of the chair of the US House of Foreign Affairs Committee, who was in Australia recently, and he bluntly stated that Australia will be a central base of operations for US Power projection in the Indo-pacific.

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00:38:54.630 --> 00:38:56.429

Vince Scappatura: and that's the expectation.

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00:38:56.510 --> 00:39:14.349

Vince Scappatura: It's not a coincidence that when US Defence think tanks like Rand and others do their wargaming exercises, who are the countries that they assume are going to participate in a US Conflict with China. It's Japan and Australia. There are other countries that are maybes. But there's assumed support from us.

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00:39:15.830 --> 00:39:20.150

Vince Scappatura: And so I just just very quickly to conclude, because I see I've run out of time.

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00:39:20.690 --> 00:39:45.059

Vince Scappatura: If we take AUKUS. If we take the US Force Posture initiatives, we take the strategic bomber rotations. We take the base upgrades, particularly at Tindal and all the interoperability exercises, and so on. What we have here is an emerging new nuclear defence posture for Australia. That may very well see Australian direct and active participation in support of US Nuclear combat operations

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00:39:45.060 --> 00:39:54.860

Vince Scappatura: in the future. This is very significant. This is new, and there's next to no transparency or accountability or discussion about this in the media, and certainly not by the government.

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00:39:55.090 --> 00:39:56.350

Vince Scappatura: Thank you.

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00:39:59.280 --> 00:40:11.620

Kellie Tranter: Thank you so much, Vince, and I'm I'm sure you've generated quite a few questions in the chat box which we'll get to at the end I'll move on just bearing in mind the time. Our final speaker is Professor Richard Tanta.

300

00:40:11.810 --> 00:40:38.369

Kellie Tranter: who is Senior Research Associate at the Nautilus Institute and honorary professor in the School of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Melbourne. Richard is a researcher and writer on the US Bases, and their influence on Australian foreign policy, and he will be picking up where Vince left it and talking about how to go about getting us unravelling all of this.

Over to you, Richard. Thank you.

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00:40:39.030 --> 00:40:45.269

Richard Tanter: Kellie. Thanks very much, and thank you to both Gareth and Vince, and Vince has made my job much easier.

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00:40:45.510 --> 00:40:53.560

Richard Tanter: Look. I'll start from the words that he was talking about, and what underlay what Gareth was talking about accountability and transparency.

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00:40:53.720 --> 00:41:05.899

Richard Tanter: If we're talking as Prime Minister, Turnbull and Keating have done, and I imagine Malcolm Fraser would have done in terms of sovereignty, and that was a phrase that Fraser used quite

304
00:41:06.010 --> 00:41:10.089
Richard Tanter: consciously. The essence of sovereignty is having

305
00:41:10.980 --> 00:41:15.180
Richard Tanter: control over the legitimate operations of your own government.

306
00:41:15.200 --> 00:41:32.969
Richard Tanter: and if there are foreign influences, they are acknowledged and under control that requires that governments be accountable. Vince made very clearly in the current circumstance, and Gareth has made very clear. Apropos AUKUS, there is virtually no attempt at accountability.

307
00:41:33.100 --> 00:41:37.900
Richard Tanter: The Australians for war powers reform which a number of people on this call have been involved in

308
00:41:38.040 --> 00:41:54.840
Richard Tanter: for over a decade, made the point. Going back to the campaign for a war. Iraq war inquiry. And now for the basic issue of Under what circumstance will Australia go to war? The issue of parliamentary approval was offered as one

309
00:41:55.180 --> 00:41:59.710
Richard Tanter: modest modest constraint on a government. Of course that's been totally ignored.

310
00:41:59.750 --> 00:42:02.879
Richard Tanter: But if you look at AUKUS, at everything that Gareth has said

311
00:42:02.920 --> 00:42:07.580
Richard Tanter: in terms of its complexities and the changes that he's registered in his own opinion.

312
00:42:07.590 --> 00:42:09.530
Richard Tanter: which I understand. Well.

313
00:42:09.750 --> 00:42:18.099
Richard Tanter: there's been no accountability, not even an attempt at accountability. We have had a parliamentary couple of parliamentary inquiries, I think, with

314
00:42:18.150 --> 00:42:25.360
Richard Tanter: public debate time, public consultancy, times of 2 weeks munificently extended, extended to 3 weeks

315

00:42:25.720 --> 00:42:30.320

Richard Tanter: on relatively constrained nuclear safety measures.

316

00:42:30.770 --> 00:42:47.919

Richard Tanter: There has been no serious debate, let alone decision making in the Parliament about what Gareth absolutely points out. Well, certainly it's the worst foreign policy decision ever by Australian government, but the which both speakers have unpacked very clearly are enormous.

317

00:42:47.930 --> 00:42:54.120

Richard Tanter: So one issue, if we're talking about sovereignty, if we're talking about independence, one related issue

318

00:42:54.210 --> 00:43:02.829

Richard Tanter: is the question of how our how dysfunctional, how dysfunctional our government is in addressing these kinds of issues

319

00:43:02.980 --> 00:43:09.610

Richard Tanter: and transparency and accountability, I think, are the the kind of mantras that we need. We need to focus on.

320

00:43:10.100 --> 00:43:14.669

Richard Tanter: I'm going to go in and out of focus in this.

321

00:43:15.600 --> 00:43:18.280

Richard Tanter: What do we want at the broadest level.

322

00:43:18.640 --> 00:43:36.240

Richard Tanter: Well, I think we start with Australia without nuclear weapons, non nuclear defence. No nuclear weapons in Australia as an absolute demand not mitigated by well, maybe extended deterrence might be like that might be involved in defence of Australia.

323

00:43:36.490 --> 00:43:38.560

Richard Tanter: I think a certain, a certain point.

324

00:43:38.630 --> 00:43:50.370

Richard Tanter: a militancy and absoluteness of demand is really important, and I'll come back to this in relation to the South Pacific nuclear weapon, free zone. And as Vince has pointed out its relationship

325

00:43:50.780 --> 00:44:07.740

Richard Tanter: to kindle in the sense that it permits the United States. Australia permits the United States to bring nuclear weapons into Australia without hindrance, and, secondly, in relation to the campaign, the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

326

00:44:07.770 --> 00:44:09.620

Richard Tanter: no nuclear weapons.

327

00:44:09.650 --> 00:44:11.540

Richard Tanter: That seems to me the starting point.

328

00:44:11.640 --> 00:44:15.180

Richard Tanter: Secondly, Gareth thought very appropriately.

329

00:44:15.250 --> 00:44:42.660

Richard Tanter: and I have to say, almost anachronistically, and I don't mean as any insult to Gareth, but rather how appalling our situation has become that! Clearly, as Keating said, not just last week, but a decade and a half ago, 2 decades ago, Australia's future must lie with Asia. Joan Lyon said it very clearly in 1,955 at the Bandung Conference. Sooner or later, he said, Australians will realize that it's taking a long time to come.

330

00:44:42.980 --> 00:44:53.070

Richard Tanter: The former deputy Chair, or Sorry, the former head of the office of national assessments. Jeff Miller, the other day, just in pearls and irritations.

331

00:44:53.950 --> 00:45:16.230

Richard Tanter: made clear that he thought the fundamental. The fundamental of Australia's strategic policy has to be, not accommodation with China, but seeking a future in which the security of China is a matter to be recognised and calculated and accepted, not as Vince and Gareth have made very clear, opposed quite frankly with nuclear weapons.

332

00:45:16.690 --> 00:45:23.829

Richard Tanter: Secondly, or thirdly, again, both speakers have talked about the way in which we need to be very clear.

333

00:45:24.030 --> 00:45:30.640

Richard Tanter: Australian defence, which is a real issue that has to be has to be talked about is being enfeebled.

334

00:45:30.670 --> 00:45:45.930

Richard Tanter: enfeebled, and endangered by almost everything to do with AUKUS. And, as Vince said, the B. 52 s. And it's been enfeebled by the irrationality and unsustainability of AUKUS in in particular.

335

00:45:46.120 --> 00:45:54.759

Richard Tanter: Fiscally, I can't imagine where any of the money is going to come for for anything else, and whether or not. Those anything else's are things that we want is another matter.

336

00:45:55.440 --> 00:46:06.169

Richard Tanter: and so essentially rational, transparent and accountability accountable decision making in defence. I mean, if you listen to people in the defence, trade

337

00:46:06.340 --> 00:46:07.610

Richard Tanter: prints industry.

338

00:46:08.300 --> 00:46:14.810

Richard Tanter: Listen to someone like Tim Bergman, the editor of Australia, Pacific defence, reporter, no radical.

339

00:46:14.920 --> 00:46:21.909

Richard Tanter: But week after week. In his podcast he assails the utter lack of transparency

340

00:46:22.190 --> 00:46:32.349

Richard Tanter: in the defence department, in defence procurement in defence operations about well, absolutely non nuclear things. He doesn't even get to that. He's got so much else to talk about.

341

00:46:32.510 --> 00:46:47.969

Richard Tanter: This is very serious. And so when people I'm sorry to embarrass you again, Kellie, like Kellie or Michelle Fay, devote their attention to unpacking the ways in which government policy is unaccountable. That's a critical area there.

342

00:46:50.120 --> 00:47:12.749

Richard Tanter: I want to shift to talk about the black holes, as I call them, not in the detail that Gareth did about AUKUS, or the detail that Vince's has about our collective work, and in particular the lovely comments he made at the end about the way in which the United States is conditioning Australia by getting operational integration with American

343

00:47:13.416 --> 00:47:14.073

Richard Tanter: and

344

00:47:15.280 --> 00:47:32.339

Richard Tanter: nuclear operations under the heading of Integrated Deterrence. But now wanting to move to actual commitment by the Defence Department a la NATO a La South Korea and Japan to having membership of an a NATO like joint nuclear planning committee. Something like that.

345

00:47:32.470 --> 00:47:34.659

Richard Tanter: His aunt is definitely on the cards.

346

00:47:35.020 --> 00:47:46.249

Richard Tanter: and I'll just say one of the things that came out very clearly from the work that we did in our next study on the B. 52 s. On the B. 52 s. In the 1980 S.

347
00:47:46.300 --> 00:47:50.800
Richard Tanter: We were fortunate to get a whole case of

348
00:47:50.840 --> 00:48:00.540
Richard Tanter: US Pacific command histories, internal, highly secret, but subsequently classified documents.

349
00:48:00.760 --> 00:48:05.380
Richard Tanter: And what that made clear is 2 things, the way in which decisions about Australia

350
00:48:05.500 --> 00:48:08.899
Richard Tanter: and B. 52 s. In Australia, in the eighties by both

351
00:48:09.230 --> 00:48:11.350
Richard Tanter: the Fraser Government and the Hawke Government

352
00:48:11.550 --> 00:48:25.019
Richard Tanter: were construed in Australia by from a very Australia focus. This was something that Malcolm did because of his cold war obsessions, or something of that sort which was not wrong, but it was largely irrelevant.

353
00:48:25.220 --> 00:48:33.970
Richard Tanter: What the papers reveal is the long term American planning and using pressure on one country against another.

354
00:48:34.000 --> 00:48:52.920
Richard Tanter: If Australia hadn't acceded to the B. 52 s. Then pressure was being put on Papua, New Guinea newly independent. It was being put on Korea and Japan, and it was being put on the Philippines. This long term planning is exactly what we should be expecting to be faced on AUKUS on the B. 52 s. And a great deal more.

355
00:48:54.680 --> 00:48:58.019
Richard Tanter: The 3rd point I'd make about the I just

356
00:48:58.050 --> 00:49:02.900
Richard Tanter: come back. The only real thing I want to say about AUKUS is to back up Vince's point.

357
00:49:03.170 --> 00:49:15.520
Richard Tanter: then I think it is very plausible, highly plausible, that we will in future, say, the United States rescind that Presidential directive in 1,991, by George Bush, the elder, the sensible one

358
00:49:15.998 --> 00:49:36.840

Richard Tanter: and one of the things to recall at that time was, the US Navy said, yes, we'll take the nuclear weapons off our ships and off our attack submarines. Leave them on the ballistic missile submarines, but we reserved the right to bring them back. It was explicitly entered into the papers as a caveat.

359

00:49:36.950 --> 00:49:42.869

Richard Tanter: and indeed, as Vince said, there is indeed a very clear pathway to that

360

00:49:42.990 --> 00:50:04.270

Richard Tanter: that it can be removed at that restraint, at the stroke of a presidential PIN, and secondly, there is a very serious development proposed by the trump Administration fumbled by Biden. But finally Congress has come back and demanded production of the sea, launched cruise, missiles.

361

00:50:04.320 --> 00:50:07.840

Richard Tanter: Slcm bracket in for nuclear.

362

00:50:08.130 --> 00:50:16.229

Richard Tanter: These are overtly, explicitly in Congressional documents specified as being required for Virginia class submarines.

363

00:50:16.290 --> 00:50:17.839

Richard Tanter: And that's what we're talking about.

364

00:50:17.860 --> 00:50:20.030

Richard Tanter: Coming to Hms. Sterling.

365

00:50:20.850 --> 00:50:23.509

Richard Tanter: That can all change nuclear weapons can come in.

366

00:50:24.370 --> 00:50:27.400

Richard Tanter: I want to say something quickly about the B. 52 s.

367

00:50:27.760 --> 00:50:29.424

Richard Tanter: Very, very quickly.

368

00:50:30.020 --> 00:50:41.389

Richard Tanter: Firstly, the model which is being utilized for Raf base. Tindal is essentially the military equivalent of fly in, fly out, workers fly in, fly out

369

00:50:41.570 --> 00:50:59.480

Richard Tanter: aircraft based in 2 bases in the Continental United States, B. 52 s. Will fly over about 2023 h to Australia. They'll be here on rotational development rotational deployment for weeks months. We don't know the answer to that up to 6 of them in current capabilities.

370

00:50:59.630 --> 00:51:08.969

Richard Tanter: but the infrastructure on which the Government, the US Government is spending half a billion dollars of their money just for the US Air Force facilities at

371

00:51:09.010 --> 00:51:11.930

Richard Tanter: at Tindal will be accompanied by

372

00:51:12.030 --> 00:51:15.970

Richard Tanter: by our town at the moment moment 75, or plus

373

00:51:16.020 --> 00:51:18.260

Richard Tanter: permanent US Staff.

374

00:51:18.610 --> 00:51:23.910

Richard Tanter: as Gareth said, that changes America, Chinese strategic planning about that.

375

00:51:24.310 --> 00:51:29.459

Richard Tanter: Vince mentioned the way in which the United States might

376

00:51:29.770 --> 00:51:31.039

Richard Tanter: in a crisis

377

00:51:31.200 --> 00:51:39.470

Richard Tanter: put nuclear weapons on B 52 s. They'll probably carry them to Australia on transport planes, but could load them onto B 52 s.

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00:51:39.610 --> 00:51:51.290

Richard Tanter: That's not just a possibility. It's a possibility explicitly identified in US Air Force safety regulations and in command regulations which we have documented.

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00:51:51.940 --> 00:52:04.140

Richard Tanter: That brings me to the really important point here, which is all this is going together, if you like. The lack of restraint on bringing nuclear weapons in is underpinned by

380

00:52:04.350 --> 00:52:10.590

Richard Tanter: what Australia itself enabled in the treaty of Raratonga. And if I can just share with you

381
00:52:10.640 --> 00:52:13.430
Richard Tanter: a little bit for one moment.

382
00:52:13.887 --> 00:52:18.660
Richard Tanter: about the Treaty of Raratonga and about the B 52. It's hang on

383
00:52:20.890 --> 00:52:29.449
Richard Tanter: 2 2 elements of nuclear permissiveness if you like. Now, firstly, on the B 52 s. This is just a slide from from the B. 52 s. Book.

384
00:52:29.600 --> 00:52:40.359
Richard Tanter: We have a policy of not only accepting and understanding US doctrines of neither confirm nor deny.

385
00:52:40.440 --> 00:52:43.300
Richard Tanter: But we actually have another version of that.

386
00:52:43.440 --> 00:52:52.510
Richard Tanter: and we simply do not ask. And that's a government statement from a former chief of the Air Force. This is a very, a kind of

387
00:52:53.040 --> 00:53:02.870
Richard Tanter: fake deniability. It's a fake version of Oh, well, it's plausible deniability. It's implausible. It's a lie, and it's an extremely dangerous one.

388
00:53:03.470 --> 00:53:16.930
Richard Tanter: We looked, and when we were testing out the provisions for the current B. 52 s. About which the Government has been both the Morrison and Albanese governments have been appallingly

389
00:53:18.535 --> 00:53:19.830
Richard Tanter: non-transparent.

390
00:53:20.460 --> 00:53:26.849
Richard Tanter: We went back to look at what Malcolm Fraser had did, and we all know Fraser's dispositions of a certain kind there.

391
00:53:27.398 --> 00:53:34.400
Richard Tanter: But what was really important in 1,981. When Fraser announced this, he insisted that

392

00:53:35.440 --> 00:53:44.390

Richard Tanter: the Americans tell Australia, whether the B. 52 s. Coming into Darwin and flying over Queensland, Western Australia, and Northern Territory, were nuclear armed.

393

00:53:45.300 --> 00:53:47.470

Richard Tanter: and then Fraser insisted

394

00:53:47.650 --> 00:53:51.159

Richard Tanter: that he had the right to inform the Parliament.

395

00:53:51.230 --> 00:54:00.510

Richard Tanter: and then he confirmed. He forced the United States to confirm in public that that was indeed the case, that they were not armed. They carried no nuclear weapons.

396

00:54:00.580 --> 00:54:03.029

Richard Tanter: and the host government informed the public.

397

00:54:03.910 --> 00:54:11.250

Richard Tanter: Fraser made the agreements public. There are many other problems there, but he made them public that has not.

398

00:54:11.940 --> 00:54:15.700

Richard Tanter: That has not happened at all in relation to the Albanese government.

399

00:54:16.490 --> 00:54:17.550

Richard Tanter: Okay.

400

00:54:17.850 --> 00:54:27.470

Richard Tanter: The second thing I want to talk about, I think again goes back to the 19 eighties is the Treaty of Raratonga. This is the one sort of detailed part of what I want to say.

401

00:54:27.570 --> 00:54:33.879

Richard Tanter: and taking a risk of speaking in front of a former Attorney general about this. So

402

00:54:33.900 --> 00:54:36.969

Richard Tanter: beware of my legal lack of skills.

403

00:54:37.230 --> 00:54:38.779

Richard Tanter: The Treaty of Raratonga.

404
00:54:39.120 --> 00:54:48.780
Richard Tanter: which was signed in August 6th of August, 1985, established the South Pacific nuclear weapon free zone. Australia chaired the drafting negotiations

405
00:54:49.000 --> 00:55:03.979
Richard Tanter: under that treaty the stationing of nuclear weapons in Australian waters and territories is prohibited, as it is in every other State party to the treaty. But the treaty largely at the Australian urging

406
00:55:04.730 --> 00:55:07.629
Richard Tanter: does not prohibit or define

407
00:55:07.850 --> 00:55:11.780
Richard Tanter: transits or visits of nuclear armed ships

408
00:55:11.940 --> 00:55:14.540
Richard Tanter: and aircraft. They are not prohibited.

409
00:55:15.040 --> 00:55:27.990
Richard Tanter: Australia incorporated its right under the treaty to decide freely whether it wanted to allow the foreign ships and aircraft nuclear armed ships into Australia

410
00:55:28.510 --> 00:55:32.649
Richard Tanter: with an act in 1,986, one section of which

411
00:55:32.750 --> 00:55:39.359
Richard Tanter: prohibits the station or position of nuclear weapons in Australia, but another section of which says, Well.

412
00:55:39.440 --> 00:55:43.249
Richard Tanter: otherwise there can be transits and visits of nuclear weapons.

413
00:55:43.550 --> 00:55:46.800
Richard Tanter: I'll leave this for the organisers to look at.

414
00:55:46.900 --> 00:55:48.649
Richard Tanter: But there's a particular provision.

415
00:55:49.200 --> 00:55:52.489

Richard Tanter: the section 15 2 in particular.

416

00:55:53.510 --> 00:56:02.199

Richard Tanter: what needs to happen. This sorry? This simply means there is no policy or legal restriction on nuclear weapons coming into Australia. So our 1st demand

417

00:56:02.590 --> 00:56:08.269

Richard Tanter: prevent nuclear weapons coming into Australia, rescind that section 15 to take it out.

418

00:56:08.360 --> 00:56:26.930

Richard Tanter: and one way of dealing with the matters that it deals with there is to follow. The example of the New Zealand Act came about a year earlier, a year later, I should say which, in the case of aircraft, the Prime Minister, when considering whether to grant approval to the landing in New Zealand of foreign military aircraft.

419

00:56:27.060 --> 00:56:43.189

Richard Tanter: the Prime Minister will have regard to information about the strategic and security interests of Australia, and in particular satisfy herself or himself that the foreign military aircraft will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device when it lands in New Zealand.

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00:56:44.910 --> 00:56:50.569

Richard Tanter: That's a big ask. And it really comes to what I want to talk about, which is the

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00:56:51.060 --> 00:56:54.510

Richard Tanter: essence of a non-nuclear Australia.

422

00:56:54.610 --> 00:56:58.250

Richard Tanter: of moving Australia back from

423

00:56:58.300 --> 00:57:10.869

Richard Tanter: one part at least, of that new nuclear posture that Vince has alluded to is to find a legislative way of preventing this, of removing our nuclear permissiveness. From that.

424

00:57:12.800 --> 00:57:23.039

Richard Tanter: I guess what I'm arguing for is a kind of nuclear politics which has some measures of absolutism about it, no nuclear weapons just this should not be compromised with.

425

00:57:23.680 --> 00:57:41.020

Richard Tanter: but also argues that in a range of areas, in legislation, in strategic doctrine, in our overall foreign policy, on issues of government accountability and transparency for its own decisions. And here, for example.

426

00:57:41.020 --> 00:58:05.750

Richard Tanter: I'm thinking that something of something that Kellie and I have done together, of trying to get out of the Albanese Government the list of bases which, under an Mou. With the United States following the Force Posture Agreement, allows the United States into what appear to be a long list of agreed facilities and operations where US Forces and contractors can go.

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00:58:06.100 --> 00:58:10.980

Richard Tanter: We have asked repeatedly for the Government to make that list clear

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00:58:11.560 --> 00:58:18.679

Richard Tanter: now. It could be that there's something unbelievably sensitive in there which has some genuine security need, although I very much doubt it.

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00:58:19.530 --> 00:58:32.429

Richard Tanter: When we look at other countries not known for their extraordinary independence and assertions of sovereignty like Hungary or Poland, which all have a lot of American bases, a lot of new American bases.

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00:58:32.500 --> 00:58:38.610

Richard Tanter: They have required the American government to allow them to publish that list of agreed

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00:58:38.710 --> 00:58:40.720

Richard Tanter: facilities and areas.

432

00:58:41.080 --> 00:58:51.879

Richard Tanter: It's not clear to me whether the Americans have prevented us doing it, or, more likely Australia's aversion to accountability has led to us censoring that.

433

00:58:52.540 --> 00:59:01.340

Richard Tanter: So I'll finish there and just say what I think we need is a whole multi-layered approach to these issues.

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00:59:01.690 --> 00:59:03.150

Richard Tanter: Gareth's

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00:59:03.750 --> 00:59:04.740

Richard Tanter: very

436

00:59:05.900 --> 00:59:09.090

Richard Tanter: genuinely informative and passionate

437

00:59:09.120 --> 00:59:16.130

Richard Tanter: account of where we are in relation to AUKUS is also a very depressing one, because it carries a certain fatalism.

438

00:59:17.070 --> 00:59:43.730

Richard Tanter: I don't know whether there's any way through AUKUS, but I'm very sure that AUKUS, the AUKUS process is going to come unstuck very badly. Just give the simple example. I noticed Dave Sweeney's on the line here from ACF. And one of the extraordinary things in the last week has been the way in which the Albanese Government and particular Mr. Miles attempted to introduce this extraordinary provision

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00:59:44.130 --> 00:59:45.810

Richard Tanter: in the Nuclear Safety

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00:59:46.840 --> 00:59:56.220

Richard Tanter: Bill before Parliament, which would have required Australia not only to have taken nuclear high level nuclear waste from Australian submarines

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00:59:56.320 --> 00:59:57.470

Richard Tanter: when they come.

442

00:59:57.590 --> 01:00:01.810

Richard Tanter: but also from UK and United States submarines.

443

01:00:02.300 --> 01:00:05.810

Richard Tanter: It was just an extraordinary thing that could have been possibly contemplated.

444

01:00:05.850 --> 01:00:10.049

Richard Tanter: and then, with what I think was actually reasonably moderate political pressure.

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01:00:10.070 --> 01:00:11.279

Richard Tanter: it was wiped.

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01:00:12.180 --> 01:00:20.540

Richard Tanter: There are going to be many more disasters like this along the way, and they give opportunities for intervention.

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01:00:20.840 --> 01:00:24.869

Richard Tanter: I'll also finish by saying Gareth mentioned our lack of

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01:00:25.470 --> 01:00:31.319

Richard Tanter: reasons for not being hopeful about external factors.

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01:00:31.750 --> 01:00:35.350

Richard Tanter: and I can understand exactly why he says so, particularly in United States.

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01:00:37.420 --> 01:00:46.090

Richard Tanter: I just ask you to consider rewinding your mental map of those matters, all of us to go back 18 months.

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01:00:46.350 --> 01:00:48.719

Richard Tanter: in other words, pre-Gaza.

452

01:00:48.980 --> 01:00:51.110

Richard Tanter: and look at the way in which

453

01:00:51.380 --> 01:00:55.910

Richard Tanter: not just the situation of Israel, but in many respects

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01:00:56.370 --> 01:01:04.490

Richard Tanter: important aspects of the Australian automatic support for American power in the world

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01:01:04.530 --> 01:01:06.569

Richard Tanter: has come to be undermined

456

01:01:07.160 --> 01:01:08.420

Richard Tanter: in our Parliament.

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01:01:08.470 --> 01:01:13.110

Richard Tanter: Certainly amongst young people, and amongst particular segments of the community.

458

01:01:13.780 --> 01:01:15.630

Richard Tanter: Sometimes events can help

459

01:01:15.850 --> 01:01:17.329

Richard Tanter: finish there. Thank you.

460

01:01:21.230 --> 01:01:35.190

Kellie Tranter: Thank you so much, Richard, for your wonderful presentation. That leaves us with close to 25 min for questions while I'm going through them. I've got my chat box up. I might just kick one off, perhaps to you, Vince.

461

01:01:35.617 --> 01:01:44.910

Kellie Tranter: You mentioned pre commitments. In your speech, and there haven't been any political pre commitments at this stage. But what would be the

462

01:01:45.030 --> 01:01:58.079

Kellie Tranter: well, I should say. How confident are you that that's the case. Given the secrecy surrounding AUKUS, and the signing of another AUKUS agreement. And what would be some of the clues, and perhaps Professor Evans.

463

01:01:58.705 --> 01:02:06.880

Kellie Tranter: with his political expertise, might give us some cues. What what we need to look for for the existence of those pre commitments.

464

01:02:08.390 --> 01:02:23.259

Vince Scappatura: Yes, thanks, Kellie, you're right. We, if there are classified documents of a joint plan in nature, it's it's conceivable that such classified documents exist that we don't know about I.

465

01:02:23.260 --> 01:02:48.199

Vince Scappatura: And obviously Gareth is a better person to respond on this than me. I suspect that if there were some form of joint planning it would have to be. It's not just one document you'd have to have a group that is a high level meeting that meets regularly. There would have to be, if not the details

466

01:02:48.200 --> 01:03:02.420

Vince Scappatura: of what is spoken about within the group revealed, at least its existence would be revealed. I don't imagine it's not the case with NATO or with South Korea that you get a detailed public

467

01:03:02.550 --> 01:03:28.029

Vince Scappatura: information transparency about the details of those operations. Of course they're very highly classified, but we know they exist at the very least. So I would expect that you would get some kind of the clue would be a formal, consultative group that explicitly talks about Australian support for US extended nuclear deterrence. But I'll turn over to Gareth, who, I'm sure, has

468

01:03:28.080 --> 01:03:31.639

Vince Scappatura: more inside information to to add.

469

01:03:31.640 --> 01:03:44.590

Gareth Evans: Well. My only insight in this respect is that governments have an extraordinary capacity to obfuscate on these things an extraordinary capacity in any area which intrudes on the, you know, so-called national security space

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01:03:44.780 --> 01:03:45.830

Gareth Evans: to

471

01:03:46.100 --> 01:03:55.679

Gareth Evans: maintain a position of absolute deniability. The only way of breaching that wall of security, of secrecy is through. Is through leaking and whistle blowing.

472

01:03:55.770 --> 01:04:09.659

Gareth Evans: There's no way of doing it officially. Forget it. You're never going to get support from the courts. You're never going to get support from the bureaucracy. You're never going to get parliamentary support for legislation which will open this up. It's gonna happen through informal channels, and periodically, of course it does, and

473

01:04:09.740 --> 01:04:14.900

Gareth Evans: while sometimes that can be irresponsible, and and, you know, quite

474

01:04:16.040 --> 01:04:20.429

Gareth Evans: indefensible in terms of putting at risk sources and all the rest of it

475

01:04:20.560 --> 01:04:24.050

Gareth Evans: on other occasions it is the.

476

01:04:24.120 --> 01:04:35.539

Gareth Evans: It is the meat and drink on which democratic accountability exists. So we have to recognize that in a way that governments are congenitally, I'm afraid, unwilling to do, including my own. Looking back.

477

01:04:38.510 --> 01:04:44.859

Kellie Tranter: Thank you, Gareth. This one is also directed to you, Gareth. It looks it's from Colin

478

01:04:44.910 --> 01:04:48.530

Kellie Tranter: Colin's asking about no 1st strike declarations.

479

01:04:48.530 --> 01:04:49.260

Gareth Evans: Use.

480

01:04:49.390 --> 01:04:50.260

Gareth Evans: yeah.

481

01:04:50.260 --> 01:05:01.379

Kellie Tranter: Yeah, no. Does Gareth think Penny Wong, or Rich and Miles would be prepared to make that declaration? It's a funny question, because we don't have nuclear weapons, but maybe some insight into its use

482

01:05:01.570 --> 01:05:04.250

Kellie Tranter: by the United States may assist.

483
01:05:04.580 --> 01:05:15.529
Gareth Evans: Well, I'm a huge. I'm a huge supporter of no 1st use declarations. Of course they can be merely rhetorical unless they're accompanied by practical measures of reduced deployment and

484
01:05:15.580 --> 01:05:26.809
Gareth Evans: reduced high trigger, alert status, and all the rest of it, of course, but nonetheless, it's just an absolute no brainer, I think, for any country which is serious about pursuing a

485
01:05:26.950 --> 01:05:28.080
Gareth Evans: a nuclear

486
01:05:28.530 --> 01:05:36.510
Gareth Evans: free agenda or a nuclear risk reduction agenda to embrace this, and one of my biggest disappointments has been

487
01:05:36.600 --> 01:05:45.609
Gareth Evans: the absolute unwillingness of Australia to take any risks in terms of challenging the United States in this respect. Joe Biden, like Barack Obama before him

488
01:05:45.640 --> 01:05:56.059
Gareth Evans: was, in fact, quite desperate to go down that particular path. His instinct they they talk the language of sole purpose rather than no 1st use, but it's essentially

489
01:05:56.120 --> 01:05:57.740
Gareth Evans: the same concept.

490
01:05:57.850 --> 01:06:13.419
Gareth Evans: Sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to retaliate, not to take any kind of strike offensive. They wanted to go down that particular path, but got no support whatsoever from their allies. They got no support from the Northeast Asian allies. They got no support from the European Central European allies, and they got no support even from Australia.

491
01:06:13.560 --> 01:06:25.229
Gareth Evans: which, you know, has for a very long time going back to the Canberra Commission and all the other things that I've been associated with has taken a very, very strong, you know, anti-nuclear posture or nuclear skeptical posture.

492
01:06:25.390 --> 01:06:40.349
Gareth Evans: So I think this is a very easy one for the Albanese Government, for Penny Wong, for Richard Miles. God help us to embrace, and that is to just get out there and overtly and actively support a no 1st use. I mean, if you are

493
01:06:40.350 --> 01:07:05.139
Gareth Evans: in love with nuclear deterrence, and you believe against the evidence that you know, it is important to retain a retaliatory capability to concentrate the minds of a potential adversary. Yes, you're going to be very reluctant to go down the path of absolute global 0. But for God's sake go down the path of nuclear risk reduction, and for God's sake, except no 1st use as a critical way station on that path.

494
01:07:07.060 --> 01:07:12.560
Kellie Tranter: Thank you. This might be for you, Richard. It's a question about

495
01:07:12.750 --> 01:07:15.620
Kellie Tranter: whether our F. 35 s.

496
01:07:15.670 --> 01:07:24.420
Kellie Tranter: Carry B. 61 or 12 s. NATO currently carries 100 B. 61 12 s. US has already built 400 plus.

497
01:07:24.650 --> 01:07:29.790
Kellie Tranter: so will B. 61 12 s. Come to RAAF Tindal, where our F. 35 s. Are now based.

498
01:07:30.860 --> 01:07:37.350
Richard Tanter: My memory is not good enough, but if they're referring to B 61 nuclear weapons.

499
01:07:37.830 --> 01:07:39.479
Richard Tanter: I assume that's the case.

500
01:07:39.901 --> 01:07:42.569
Richard Tanter: Then? No, I don't think they will.

501
01:07:43.215 --> 01:07:50.599
Richard Tanter: Not at present. I think the the reason for that is the range of the F. 35 S. Is not

502
01:07:50.820 --> 01:07:55.620
Richard Tanter: especially favourable, particularly compared with B. 52 s.

503
01:07:55.700 --> 01:08:02.009
Richard Tanter: But we can expect B. 52 s. Armed with long range

504
01:08:02.050 --> 01:08:11.969

Richard Tanter: nuclear missiles and conventional missiles to be flying out of Tindal, supported, protected by F. 35 s. From Australia, and

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01:08:12.050 --> 01:08:31.100

Richard Tanter: refueled by relays of Australian tankers to get them to the South China Sea. Assuming, of course, the Indonesians have no particular objection to that along the way, and supported by airborne early warning, airborne control and warning aircraft.

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01:08:31.180 --> 01:08:40.899

Richard Tanter: So Australia provides a screen for that to happen. It is possible. The point is that those F. 35 s. Which are being deployed or are deployed. Both US Air Force and

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01:08:40.979 --> 01:08:52.500

Richard Tanter: other non US NATO air forces in Europe with B. 61 s. Have got a rather smaller range to deal with in parts of Russia or below Russia.

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01:08:52.540 --> 01:08:58.699

Richard Tanter: So that would be my answer. I don't know whether Vince has a different position on this. We haven't talked about it.

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01:09:00.189 --> 01:09:22.749

Vince Scappatura: No, no, I think you're absolutely right, Richard. I noted that that only very recently did the B 61 nuclear bomb be authorized for use on the F. 35. And there's only particular F. 35 s. That it's authorized on certain ones that are assigned nuclear emissions. And I think the relevant scenario, for that is Europe rather than the Indo-pacific or Australia.

510

01:09:25.760 --> 01:09:47.450

Kellie Tranter: This question looks like it's to everybody. What is the likelihood? Pine Gap is being used to relay military intelligence to Israel. What power does the Australian Government have to stop that flow of military intelligence to Israel? Assuming this is the case to stop it. Given US control of Pine Gap? And 3. How might this loss of power and control of the Australian Government be a reflection

511

01:09:47.460 --> 01:09:53.990

Kellie Tranter: of how things might be only worse with AUKUS and expansion of the base upgrades at Tindal and other bases.

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01:09:54.310 --> 01:09:56.839

Kellie Tranter: So there's a bit to unpack there.

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01:09:58.280 --> 01:09:58.930

Kellie Tranter: Okay.

514
01:09:58.930 --> 01:10:10.259
Richard Tanter: I'll talk briefly about Pine Gap in Gaza. Yes, I have no doubt that the capability of satellite signal intelligence satellites controlled from Pine Gap

515
01:10:10.400 --> 01:10:18.920
Richard Tanter: which sit roughly over Southeast Asia, going towards the end of the Indian Ocean.

516
01:10:19.290 --> 01:10:24.630
Richard Tanter: have the capability to generate

517
01:10:24.840 --> 01:10:27.730
Richard Tanter: intelligence, communications, intelligence.

518
01:10:27.770 --> 01:10:47.839
Richard Tanter: a lot of other signals. Intelligence downlinked to Pine Gap, processed at Pine Gap, forwarded to the National Security Agency in Washington, and then, under a myriad range of agreements, only revealed to us, as Gareth pointed out by Edward Snowden's leaking of NSA. Documents

519
01:10:48.100 --> 01:10:53.680
Richard Tanter: we know over the past 30 years have been a number of escalating agreements.

520
01:10:53.800 --> 01:11:01.910
Richard Tanter: and there's a technical capability. There's an historical precedent, we know, in 1,973. The United States did not ask us

521
01:11:01.950 --> 01:11:05.960
Richard Tanter: when Pine Gap data was forwarded to the Idf.

522
01:11:05.990 --> 01:11:10.670
Richard Tanter: Very important for for the Idf. Strategically, then.

523
01:11:10.680 --> 01:11:13.399
Richard Tanter: I'm sure that's the case today.

524
01:11:13.989 --> 01:11:24.790
Richard Tanter: I think it is another example, of course, about the level of integration that Gareth has documented for AUKUS of our, I think.

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01:11:25.540 --> 01:11:33.060

Richard Tanter: certainly unresisted, and I would say, largely, increasingly unthinking integration with.

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01:11:33.340 --> 01:11:43.030

Richard Tanter: firstly, as Vince was talking about US Nuclear war planning, but equally to American combat operations around the world.

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01:11:43.040 --> 01:11:46.200

Richard Tanter: And Pine Gap is central to both

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01:11:46.350 --> 01:11:57.389

Richard Tanter: nuclear command and control nuclear operations against China very definitely, but equally for. Well, genocide in Gaza and our complicity in it.

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01:11:58.570 --> 01:12:06.849

Richard Tanter: I'm not sure, Kellie, how much of the rest of you want to go on with that, because it might take us a bit of distance away from our core. Our core issue.

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01:12:06.850 --> 01:12:12.090

Kellie Tranter: That's fine. I do have a question for for Professor Evans. In terms.

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01:12:12.090 --> 01:12:13.240

Gareth Evans: Yes, please let's.

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01:12:13.240 --> 01:12:14.359

Kellie Tranter: Yeah. Gary.

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01:12:14.360 --> 01:12:14.760

Gareth Evans: They will.

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01:12:14.760 --> 01:12:26.039

Kellie Tranter: Let's be pals look at in relation to a comprehensive and generally objective review, as you spoke about what would be the catalyst

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01:12:26.140 --> 01:12:35.899

Kellie Tranter: for a Labor government to to look at that you know what sort of pressure would have to bear on them to say, Look, let's have a review. We've got an election coming up.

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01:12:36.440 --> 01:12:38.990

Kellie Tranter: What? What really would would

537
01:12:39.090 --> 01:12:42.459
Kellie Tranter: sort of flick that switch for them? Do you think if anything.

538
01:12:42.930 --> 01:12:44.420
Gareth Evans: Well, nothing.

539
01:12:44.470 --> 01:12:59.080
Gareth Evans: I I can't see it. I can't see it happening. I mean I I would love to think otherwise, but I think the only credible option for a complete rethink of where we're going on. All this is an external decision by the United States to bail out of this because of their concern

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01:12:59.180 --> 01:13:05.039
Gareth Evans: that they're not going to have the industrial capacity to produce enough Virginia's to give us or sell us.

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01:13:05.050 --> 01:13:28.750
Gareth Evans: even with the the money that we're giving them. You know 3 extra. I I honestly feel that's the only way through this. The the political realities is that any any government, any Labor government is any Labor opposition, any Labor government is neurotic in the extreme about being wedged on national security issues because of, you know, umpteen decades of demonization about our

542
01:13:28.750 --> 01:13:38.379
Gareth Evans: commitment to serious and credible defence of the country. And you know it's just not in someone like Albo's DNA to even contemplate

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01:13:38.420 --> 01:13:47.459
Gareth Evans: yielding to that and changing course. Now the big opportunity to do that was through a full scale review at the time that they came into government they could have

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01:13:47.530 --> 01:14:03.649
Gareth Evans: got a whole bunch of, you know, very, very serious, objective defence people, because there's lots of lots of very serious military personnel submariners, admirals who are very, very skeptical, very, very concerned about the AUKUS thing, and think it's just going down the wrong.

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01:14:04.260 --> 01:14:19.880
Gareth Evans: the wrong path, the opportunity to get all that out into the open was there on day one. But it didn't happen then. Didn't happen with the Defence Security Review a year later, and it's not going to happen now. I wish it were otherwise, but I'm afraid I can't give you any nourishment or any confidence on that front.

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01:14:20.800 --> 01:14:28.600
Richard Tanter: Kellie, can I say something there? And to Gareth, because we've been talking about this one way or another for more than 30 years, and I recall the time

547
01:14:28.620 --> 01:14:35.209
Richard Tanter: you were speaking very generously to my nuclear weapons class at Melbourne University, and I think I asked you.

548
01:14:35.310 --> 01:14:44.539
Richard Tanter: as a former campaign manager for the Nuclear Disarmament Party during the 1,984 election, and all the events surrounding that and those huge demonstrations

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01:14:44.590 --> 01:14:53.450
Richard Tanter: at that time, you know, did it make any difference? And I seem to recall you said something to the effect of well, personally it did. It was very unpleasant

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01:14:53.520 --> 01:14:58.439
Richard Tanter: to be harassed in that way, and every ALP branch harassing members.

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01:14:58.580 --> 01:15:09.210
Richard Tanter: Then you said, of course, the the key matter was that you had you, Richard? Peace movement had a champion in Cabinet, and I think you pointed at that state

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01:15:09.460 --> 01:15:10.990
Richard Tanter: to Bill Hayden.

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01:15:11.650 --> 01:15:25.920
Richard Tanter: The point I want to make is not whether or not there's a champion about that that may reverse things. It's very that would be, perhaps fantasy to talk about, but the level of pressure that was put on you in those years was not enormous in certain respects

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01:15:26.060 --> 01:15:29.369
Richard Tanter: and in many ways. The kind of

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01:15:29.670 --> 01:15:45.939
Richard Tanter: fate that you're pointing to quite rightly, that AUKUS brings us to is much more serious even than we pointed to in the 1983 84 85 new Cold War era, which was pretty bloody, dangerous.

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01:15:47.650 --> 01:15:49.039
Gareth Evans: Can't argue with any of that.

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01:15:49.430 --> 01:16:02.839

Gareth Evans: Can't argue with any of that. And I I despair about the the mess we've got ourselves into, and I despair about my own incapacity. With all the alleged creativity which I'm supposed to be capable, I despair of my capacity to see a way through this.

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01:16:03.362 --> 01:16:07.290

Gareth Evans: I think the the only possible way through this is, if a

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01:16:07.400 --> 01:16:15.170

Gareth Evans: a really substantial case can be made, having no submarines at all, but rather putting all our defence eggs into the basket

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01:16:15.280 --> 01:16:16.240

Gareth Evans: of

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01:16:16.840 --> 01:16:22.790

Gareth Evans: air, fighting, capability, missile capability, and drone capability, including undersea

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01:16:22.870 --> 01:16:34.749

Gareth Evans: weaponry. I suspect these are the weapons of the future which in 30, 40 years time are going to be far more salient and useful for the defence of the country than any manned submarine capability.

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01:16:34.770 --> 01:16:40.260

Gareth Evans: And maybe just maybe if we can get a debate going about that

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01:16:40.370 --> 01:16:50.019

Gareth Evans: rather than having yet another catastrophic, you know, perceived to catastrophic about turn. And yet another stuffed up submarine program. And yet another

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01:16:50.040 --> 01:16:53.569

Gareth Evans: stuffed up attempt to recreate yet another program.

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01:16:53.590 --> 01:17:04.520

Gareth Evans: If we maybe we can change the terms of that debate, something will be possible. But there's an extraordinary willingness on the part of all the the politicians that I talk to these days to say.

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01:17:04.570 --> 01:17:29.670

Gareth Evans: Well, the decision's been made, that's it. It may be a total catastrophe, maybe a total cluster, if but it's going to be someone else's responsibility in 2, 3 4 terms, time to deal with the consequences of that. It's not going to be ours politically. So what the hell let's just, you know, focus on things which are less you know, politically, potentially troublesome. And I mean, that's that's the political reality we're dealing with. And it's that's very.

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01:17:29.710 --> 01:17:30.970
Gareth Evans: It's very unhappy.

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01:17:32.860 --> 01:17:35.500
Gareth Evans: Sorry to let you down, Richard. I mean, you've always been a

570
01:17:35.840 --> 01:17:37.200
Gareth Evans: a supreme.

571
01:17:37.210 --> 01:17:41.156
Gareth Evans: I thought I was an optimist. You were. You're one of Nature's

572
01:17:41.530 --> 01:17:48.050
Gareth Evans: totally incorrigible optimists about this sort of stuff I'm I'm a little bit more pessimistic about the current realities in this context.

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01:17:48.920 --> 01:17:52.419
Richard Tanter: I think we disagree largely about the pathway. But let's keep get going.

574
01:17:52.836 --> 01:18:14.889
Kellie Tranter: And I would. And that's why I mentioned obviously, at the outset that we we, as a as a advocacy group, should not rule out the importance of 1st nations in terms of land use and test cases. Because there would be plenty of examples where land has been

575
01:18:14.910 --> 01:18:18.170
Kellie Tranter: used in a way which was not properly

576
01:18:20.493 --> 01:18:35.009
Kellie Tranter: indicated to them at the outset. The Arnhem Space Center is a perfect point where it was sold as space exploration and scientific research town saw the opportunity after mining

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01:18:35.010 --> 01:18:59.659
Kellie Tranter: was is mining sort of moving out walk site, mining for jobs and and for the town to prosper. But something tells me it wasn't really made clear that the extent to which that site would be used for defence purposes, and particularly in the context of a 1st strike taking out an adversary satellite. So there would be lots of examples of land use. And on

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01:18:59.660 --> 01:19:19.919

Kellie Tranter: on 1st Nations land where you know, 1st nations were not properly consulted. But I've got one final question before Annette does a wrap up tonight, and that's it. Looks like to Richard or Vince. Do you think other raft bases will receive bombers? EG. Amberley?

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01:19:22.650 --> 01:19:32.859

Richard Tanter: Well, I already Amberleppy receives B, 2 bombers in not rotational deployments, but short task force deployments. Tindal

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01:19:33.350 --> 01:19:43.259

Richard Tanter: has had visits from B 2 bombers. The B 2 bombers are more modern, so to speak, more dangerous for China, because they can penetrate

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01:19:43.300 --> 01:19:46.040

Richard Tanter: Chinese airspace.

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01:19:46.100 --> 01:19:53.660

Richard Tanter: The visit to Tin to Tindalforce was a matter of repairing an engine, which sounds very techy, but it does tell you

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01:19:53.920 --> 01:20:07.169

Richard Tanter: we are offering extraordinary capabilities to the Americans. I think the B. 52 S. Are the test case. I think there will be B 2 deployments to come. I'm not sure Vince and I haven't really talked this one through.

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01:20:07.250 --> 01:20:24.230

Richard Tanter: but I think they'll be there. But certainly, the changes which are going on at a whole raft of Northern Australian air bases from Learmonth on the North West Cape, through to the so called bear bases of sugar and

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01:20:24.420 --> 01:20:41.629

Richard Tanter: and curtain across northern territory, suggests the Americans have asked us to elevate or to open the door more widely in general, technically, what they're technically capable of doing. And then we'll talk has been suggested later on about how we might go about using them.

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01:20:43.150 --> 01:20:47.520

Vince Scappatura: Yeah, I'll just reiterate what? What Richard said.

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01:20:48.140 --> 01:21:04.360

Vince Scappatura: You know, the the Force Posture Agreement is extraordinarily wide open in terms of the kinds of operations and access that the US Air Force and Government is enabled to use.

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01:21:04.600 --> 01:21:29.869

Vince Scappatura: We talked about. You know what's important is not just the rotations of the forces but the base infrastructure. And this is why we signal out Tindal because Tindal has the squadron operations, the maintenance facility, the big fuel reserves, and so on. Darwin base also has a squadrons operations facility, but it's for use by the US Navy, not the US Air Force. So it's still very significant, but not for the strategic bombers.

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01:21:30.090 --> 01:21:35.689

Vince Scappatura: just going very quickly back to the forced posture agreement

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01:21:35.700 --> 01:21:49.869

Vince Scappatura: as part of our research and the forthcoming papers that Richard and I are working on on Fraser's 1980 S. Policy, and also the Raratonga Treaty. We've been looking at. You know, the various agreements

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01:21:49.870 --> 01:22:05.940

Vince Scappatura: that the Australian Government has negotiated with the US Government to allow in strategic bombers from the United States. And it's just extraordinary when looking at how this has evolved over the decades

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01:22:05.940 --> 01:22:28.629

Vince Scappatura: just how wide open the Force Posture Agreement is, and just how unprecedented it is. When Fraser negotiated the 1st agreement to allow B. 52 S. Into Northern Australia. As Richard mentioned, it was very globally significant, because it obviated the worldwide policy of neither confirm nor deny by getting an explicit

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01:22:28.630 --> 01:22:56.200

Vince Scappatura: acknowledgment from the US Government that there were no nuclear weapons, no weapons at all on board, but it was very limited. The agreement was, you know, surveillance and navigation operations. It was landings in Darwin unarmed, no nuclear weapons, and the terms of the agreement were made public. They were published in hand side in Parliament. You can look them up. There's the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State. The Australian Foreign Minister was

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01:22:56.200 --> 01:23:09.660

Vince Scappatura: became the treaty, and that was all. All public. The next kind of iteration of strategic bomber deployments to Australia was in 2,005 under the Howard Government, with the strategic bomber training program.

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01:23:09.660 --> 01:23:19.029

Vince Scappatura: and there was a new statement of principles that was negotiated. Now that's classified, it wasn't made public, so we don't know what's in it

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01:23:19.030 --> 01:23:45.099

Vince Scappatura: from the bits that we do know from questions in Parliament. We know the agreement expanded, the initial 1,981 exchange of notes by now, of course, allowing these bombers to be armed. The strategic bomber training program was US B 52 bombers, but also b, 1 and B, 2 bombers, using mainly the Delamire air weapons range in Northern territory for long range bombing runs.

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01:23:45.100 --> 01:24:13.310

Vince Scappatura: So now we're allowing the Americans to arm the strategic bombers. We're expanding the range of bombers from the B. 52 s. To the b. 1 and the B. 2, and we haven't asked for an explicit guarantee that there will be no nuclear weapons on board. Now, of course, the US is not going to be dropping nuclear weapons on Delamir air weapons range, but still the principle of not of adhering to neither confirm nor denied was was

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01:24:13.340 --> 01:24:21.540

Vince Scappatura: reestablished in that 2,005 statement of principles. But still there were limitations there. We get to the Force Posture Agreement.

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01:24:21.550 --> 01:24:51.469

Vince Scappatura: And now we have B. 52 s. And B. Twos and b 1 s. Not just deploying, for, you know, being allowed to land at Darwin not just being used for long range bombing runs on Northern territory, bombing ranges, but now given access to innumerable number of agreed facilities and areas which Richard mentioned are classified, and despite Kellie and Richard's best attempts, I cannot get any transparency

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01:24:51.470 --> 01:25:17.159

Vince Scappatura: around this. So there's innumerable facilities. We don't know how many. And and it's not just about that. The types of missions have been extended in the 4th posture agreement to not just training exercises or bombing exercise, and so on. We've got security cooperation exercises. We've got humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. And then we have this extraordinary statement of any such other mutually determined activities.

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01:25:17.480 --> 01:25:34.350

Vince Scappatura: any such other mutually determined activities, which means, you know, almost anything. Right? So, and then, beyond that, the force, posture, agreement also established, you know, combined logistics, sustainment, sorry sustainment and maintenance.

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01:25:34.350 --> 01:25:50.569

Vince Scappatura: enterprise, so pre positioning stores, munitions, fuel, and so on to allow the bombers that rotate here to be supported to engage in high end war, fighting, combined military operations, and so on. So when looking at that evolution of the way in which

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01:25:50.570 --> 01:26:05.780

Vince Scappatura: Australia has negotiated successive deployments of B 52 bombers. It's become ever more expansive and and less transparent in each iteration. And I think that's you know, that's very sad and disappointing. But it's the state of affairs. Unfortunately.

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01:26:06.810 --> 01:26:18.870

Kellie Tranter: Thanks, Vince, and before I hand over to Annette, I'll just say it's also would be interesting to look at. The decision by Richard Miles to recruit

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01:26:18.880 --> 01:26:22.259

Kellie Tranter: dual nationals, including Americans in the Adf.

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01:26:22.340 --> 01:26:35.839

Kellie Tranter: And what that means, in reality in terms of alliance to a country in a crisis, and who would be actually, who would be giving the orders, and whose orders would be followed, and whether that's just a Trojan horse

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01:26:35.840 --> 01:26:54.470

Kellie Tranter: to up the the troop numbers without sort of alerting people to it. So that's something also that feeds into the the build up. But look, I'm going to hand. We could talk all night, but I'm going to hand over to Annette, and I thank you all for such wonderful rich presentations that have given us a lot a lot to think about.

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01:26:54.716 --> 01:27:02.100

Kellie Tranter: There's a lot to be depressed about, but lots to be hopeful about as well, so I thank you all for joining us, and I'll hand over to Annette.

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01:27:03.360 --> 01:27:30.349

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: Well, a big thank you to you, too, Kellie and at the beginning of this webinar I should have introduced Kellie as one of our most recently agreed to patrons of IPAN. Kellie, along with Ian Lowe, have agreed to be 2 patrons of IPAN, and we we're very, very grateful for the the honor of having both of you as patrons.

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01:27:30.710 --> 01:27:50.900

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: Well, what a fantastic update from our 3 speakers on just how Australia is being prepared as a launching pad for war. It's really hard to avoid that. And the reality is that the the you know what war would mean

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01:27:50.950 --> 01:27:56.580

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: is just not talked about enough. That's how I feel. You know we talk about.

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01:27:56.590 --> 01:28:05.650

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: you know, preparing on such and such a year for a war with China. And yet the human consequences, the economic, the

613

01:28:05.650 --> 01:28:27.750

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: environmental consequences. And as one of the questioners raised was the issue of refugees. You know, we we've had this ongoing issue of dealing with a few boatloads of refugees. Imagine what would happen if there was, in fact, a war in our region, and it wouldn't only affect China, it would be all of the countries in our region.

614

01:28:27.750 --> 01:28:56.430

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: So you know, I think we've opened this discussion up again, as we need need to keep doing. And, in fact, this webinar is a lead event to the upcoming IPAN Conference,

which we hold every 2 years because they are a lot of work to organize. It is a fantastic conference with something like 30 different speakers speaking on panels to do with all the issues that we've discussed tonight.

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01:28:56.550 --> 01:29:03.320

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: and particularly as we now reach the 3rd year since this secret

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01:29:03.890 --> 01:29:14.150

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: agreement was reached and dropped. On the whole of us. It was such a shock, I think, for everybody to have the AUKUS announcement made.

617

01:29:14.420 --> 01:29:15.500

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: and

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01:29:15.770 --> 01:29:21.573

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: you know it's hard to believe it was a shock for the likes of

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01:29:22.170 --> 01:29:25.999

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: of Richard Marles. I'd like to know more about that.

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01:29:26.010 --> 01:29:30.149

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: The recent book that's been published by Andrew Fowler Newt.

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01:29:30.658 --> 01:29:59.770

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: Is a great look into the background of the AUKUS agreement, and and Andrew will be speaking at the conference, as well as many, many other wonderful and and authoritative speakers, so I won't hold you up any longer. It's been a really great Webinar. Thank you, Richard. Thank you, Vince. Thank you, Gareth, and thank you, Kellie, as well, and I hope to see as many of you as possible

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01:30:00.150 --> 01:30:09.879

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: at the IPAN Conference. You can join online if going to Perth is too too difficult, either expensive or just too difficult to get there.

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01:30:09.970 --> 01:30:17.920

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: but we hope to have many people joining us online, as well as attending the conference in Perth in person.

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01:30:18.570 --> 01:30:20.060

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: Good night, everyone.

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01:30:20.060 --> 01:30:23.580

Jonathan Pilbrow: Annette, I'm just putting it up on the chat. If it isn't already [the link to IPAN Conference]

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01:30:24.950 --> 01:30:25.420

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: Yes.

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01:30:25.420 --> 01:30:26.030

Jonathan Pilbrow: Exactly.

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01:30:26.030 --> 01:30:36.849

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: We'll just hold on there for a moment or 2 for those of you who want to click on the the details of the conference, how you can register either online or in person.

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01:30:37.160 --> 01:30:40.160

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: And yes, we look forward to

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01:30:40.260 --> 01:30:59.579

Annette Brownlie Independent and Peaceful Australia Network: building the movement. That, I think, is the only way that we're going to see pressure enough pressure put on whichever government is in power in Australia to look at ways in which we can turn this ship around because we're really in dangerous waters right now. Thank you.

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01:31:05.780 --> 01:31:06.870

Jonathan Pilbrow: Thanks. Everyone.